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THE LIFE OF KÖPRÜLÜZADE FAZIL MUSTAFA PASHA
AND HIS REFORMS (1637-1691)

Fehmi YILMAZ

His life before his vizierate

The Köprülüs are known as an eminent vizier family in the Ottoman state due to their reforming initiatives especially when the state encountered serious internal and external problems in the second half of the seventeenth century. The name of Köprülü comes from the town of Köprü located near Amasya. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, who gave his name to the family, was brought to İstanbul from Albania as a devshirme recruit when he was a child, and he was trained in the *Acemi Oglanlar Odjagi* of the palace. He spent a significant period of his youth in the palace. He was appointed as hassa cook in the *Matbah-ı Amire* in 1623. He also joined the retinue of Boshnak Hüsrev Pasha who was employed in the same period in the *Has-Oda* and who would later become a grand vizier. Although Köprülü Mehmed Pasha joined the Hazine-i Amire Hademeleri, he could not keep his post for long because of his awkward character. He was a quarrelsome and harsh person. He was consequently expelled from the palace, and being granted the title of Sipahi. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha was assigned the town of Köprü which was located near Amasya as a timar. He married the daughter of the *voyvoda* of the town of Köprü where he settled and raised his family who were thus to be known as Köprülü.¹

¹ Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Zübde-i Vekaiyat*, Translated by Abdülkadir Özcan, Ankara, 1995, p. 6; Osmanzade Tayyib Ahmed, *Hadikatü'l-Vüzerâ*, İstanbul, 1271 [1854], p. 104-106.

Köprülüzade Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was the second son of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha. He was two years younger than his elder brother Fazıl Ahmed Pasha. He was born in 1637 in the town of Köprü, which was possessed by his father Köprülü Mehmed Pasha as a timar.² He spent part of his childhood in Köprü, and in various other cities, Trabzon, Karaman, Damascus, İznik in Anatolia and Küstendil in Rumelia, where his father took several posts.³ He commenced medrese education in early years of his childhood with his brother Fazıl Ahmed and he also took private lessons for a long period from the prominent professors of that time. He joined the *Dergah-ı Ali Müteferrikas* in 1659.⁴ During his father's grand vizierate (1656-1661) he invited members of the ulema to the library established by him between in İstanbul, and he took private lessons from them. He improved his knowledge of Islamic sciences, and especially hadith, through these lessons. These invitations and studies of scholars in the library continued during his and his brother's grand vizierate.⁵ Although his elder brother was a müderris, historical sources do not provide any concrete data about whether Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was a müderris. There is no evidence even on this matter even in *Tarih-i Sülale-i Köprülüzade*, the source for their family history.

Although there is not a great deal of information about the activities of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, who was deeply interested in Islamic sciences, during the vizierate of his father Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, he joined the Kandiya Siege in Crete and other campaigns in Rumelia. Through these experiences he had the opportunity to observe every stage of the sieges and campaigns in Crete.⁶ Confirmation of his presence at Kandiya is that his brother Ahmed Pasha died unexpectedly in October 1676, the imperial seal, *Mühr-i Hümayun*, was brought back to the sultan by Köprülüzade Fazıl Mustafa Pasha.⁷

2 Behçetî İbrahim Efendi, *Tarih-i Sülale-i Köprülüzade*, Köprülü Kütüphanesi, İstanbul, no: 212, p. 164.

3 Joseph Von Hammer Purgstall, *Osmanlı Devleti Tarihi*, 11 vols., Translated by Mehmet Ata, İstanbul, 1986, p. 6-7.

4 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Mühimme Defteri (MD) 93, p. 54.

5 Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 164.

6 BOA., Ali Emiri Tasnifi, IV. Mehmed, no: 229.

7 Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 165.

The earliest direct information about Fazıl Mustafa Pasha is found in chronicles and in archival documents from before the second Siege of Vienna. Thus, if Köprülüzade Fazıl Mustafa Pasha's life is to be divided into periods, it would be pertinent to draw the dividing line at the Second Vienna Siege in order to reach a better understanding of him and his period. Consideration of events and political developments before and after Second Vienna Siege lead us to make a such division; as this was a milestone for both Fazıl Mustafa Pasha and the Köprülü family.

The first event of consequence was the Çehrin campaign which saw the appointment of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha as seventh kubbe vizier. In 1669, Doreshenko, Hatman of the Sarikamish Cossacks, had requested Ottoman protection against the King of Poland and the Han of Tatar. The Ottomans sent him a *bayrak*, *tug* and *mehterhane* as a token of their protection of the Kazak Hatmanı. Ottoman But this protectorate was finalised with the Treaty of Bucaş, signed 16 October 1672, at the end of the war which was waged with Poland; and also by giving Ukraine with in its old frontiers, was given to the Sarikamish Cossacks.⁸ However, in early 1675 hatman Doreshenko changed sides and handed over the Cehryn fortress to the Russians. Therefore, in spring 1677 Şeytan İbrahim Pasha was appointed as serdar and came to the region with Crimean Han Selim Giray.⁹ At the same time the Ottomans freed Himielnitski, former Hatman of Zaporughian Cossacks, who had been imprisoned in the Yedikule Dungeon after becoming a priest; and he was subsequently appointed as hatman of the Cossacks in place of Doreshenko.¹⁰ The first Ottoman siege of Cehryn fortress lasted twenty-three days and ended in failure on 28.May.1677.¹¹ When the preparations for the second siege were completed in İstanbul, Ottoman forces set out towards Çehrin under the leadership of Sultan Mehmed IV on 30 April 1678. When they arrived in Silistria, the sultan appointed Vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha who was

8 Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, Edited by Fahri Çetin Derin, İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, İstanbul 1993, p. 168-169; Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 49-50.

9 Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol. 7, İstanbul, p. 554; Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 80-81.

10 Ibid, p. 81; Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, p. 189; Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silahdar Tarihi*, vol. 1, İstanbul, 1928, p. 655.

11 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 85.

brother-in-law of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, as commander of the army and sent him to Cehryn. The Ottoman army was under the leadership of Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha when it captured the fortress of Cehryn from the Russians and demolished it.¹² This success greatly inspired the Ottoman state, and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, the conqueror of Cehryn, was welcomed with great enthusiasm. The sultan, who was in Edirne, later returned to İstanbul on 20 April 1679.¹³

The recapture of Cehryn created great enthusiasm in İstanbul. The sultan's esteem for and confidence in the Köprülü family became greater since Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha was brother-in-law to the Köprülü family. Henceforth, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was appointed to crucial posts. He continued his Islamic studies after the death of his elder brother Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, and was appointed in May 1680 as seventh kubbe vizier by Sultan Mehmed IV with a significant *hass*.¹⁴

From then onwards there is more information about the activities of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha. He was appointed as a guard, *muhafiz*, on 12 December 1680 to accompany the Valide Sultan, Prince Süleyman and Prince Ahmed on the third Cehryn campaign against Russia.¹⁵ When the Russian Tsar received information about an expedition prepared against him by the Ottoman state, he sued for peace through the mediation of Murat Giray. The Sultan returned to İstanbul after signing a treaty which was advantageous to the Ottoman state in 13 February 1681.¹⁶ Furthermore, in February 1681, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was promoted to sixth kubbe vizier and he was recharged as guard of Valide Sultan, Prince Süleyman and Prince Ahmed who were living in Edirne.¹⁷

However, in 1683, the Ottoman state had prepared a campaign against Austria under the command of Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa. Tension escalated when Austria occupied part of Hungary, and the Ottomans extended protection to Emre Thokoly as Hungarian King. The Ottomans also had given some

12 Ibid, p. 102-103.

13 Ibid, p. 6.

14 Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 164; Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 731; Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 114.

15 Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 734.

16 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 119-120.

17 Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, vol. 2, İstanbul, 1928, p. 738.

fortresses to Emre Thokoly, which exacerbated the situation. But these were abandoned by the Ottomans after their defeat at the siege of Vienna.¹⁸ When the Vienna campaign began, Grand Vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha appointed as kaimmakam the former governor of Aleppo Çaşnigir-zade vizier Mahmud Pasha to İstanbul; he also appointed Köprülü Fazıl Mustafa to Edirne and Kara İbrahim Pasha to Belgrade where the sultan was residing.¹⁹ Appointments to İstanbul and Belgrade were an ordinary transaction of Ottoman bureaucracy. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, who was the sixth kubbe vizier and who was also charged with protecting Valide Sultan and her sons, was now appointed kaim-makam of Edirne and promoted fourth kubbe vizier when Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha moved toward Vienna after the declaration of war between the Ottoman state and Austria.²⁰

The duties of the Edirne Kaimmakamlığı are unclear. There were three different kaimmakams during campaign: these kaimmakams were in İstanbul, Edirne and Belgrade. The Kaimmakam in the Ottoman central administration refers to the proxy remaining in İstanbul when the grand vizier leaves the seat of government to exercise his duties as commander in chief, *serdar-ı ekrem*, of the army or any other reason. Kaim-makams were generally chosen among the kubbe viziers and they were as plenipotentiary as a Grand Vizier. Certain sultans resided in Edirne in order to be closer to the army or because they enjoyed staying there. If the Sultan resided in Edirne and sent his grand vizier on campaign as a serdar, a kaim-makam was to be appointed by the grand vizier.²¹

However, the appointment of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha as kaim-makam of Edirne when the Sultan was not present, was an unfamiliar transaction. As a general principle grand viziers appointed a trusted confidant as kaim-makam when they left İstanbul. Thus they could ensure that their duties would be performed in a sound manner when they themselves left the center, and they thereby especially hoped to prevent intrigues and counter-movements against

18 Ibid, p. 741-744; Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 124-126.

19 Defterdar, *Zübde*. p. 135-136, 140.

20 Ibid, p. 164.

21 M. Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, vol. 2, İstanbul 1993, p. 219-222.

themselves For instance during the Austrian (1663) and Crete Campaigns (1665) Fazıl Ahmed Pasha had appointed his brother-in-law Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha as kaim-makam of İstanbul despite the fact that he was a Kaptan-ı Derya²². Similarly Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was appointed as kaim-makam of Edirne for three reasons. First of all, he was the close relative of the Grand Vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha. Secondly Edirne had strategic importance, and thirdly the mother of the sultan and princes were in Edirne.

Shortly after the Ottoman army reached Vienna on 7 July 1683 Mehmed IV's mother died.²³ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was promoted to third kubbe vizier after the death of Valide Sultan. He had also been appointed to a crucial post, that of Silistria governor and military commander of Babadaghi. When the sandjak of Niğbolu was re-captured from the Austrians, it had been included in the border eyalet of Silistria. Thus, the protection of Silistria against the Austrians became an important matter. The fact that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had joined the Polish campaigns with his elder brother Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, and his familiarity with the region influenced the decision to appoint him.²⁴

The Köprülü family had lost their prestige after the Ottoman defeat before Vienna. Grand vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha who was the son-in-law of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, was dismissed and executed on 25 December 1683.²⁵ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was dismissed from his post as military commander as well. The putative reason was the belief that he could not defend the Kaminiec and Bogdan regions against an expedition organized by the King of Poland. Thus, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was dismissed from the military command of Babadaghi and Süleyman Pasha was appointed in his place.²⁶ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha went to Edirne and continued to carry out duties of third kubbe alti vizier.²⁷

The pressures directed against the Köprülü family, increased especially during the grand vizierate of Kara İbrahim Pasha, who was appointed

22 İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol 3, Ankara 1988, p. 421.

23 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 156.

24 Ibid, p. 164.

25 Ibid, p. 166.

26 Ibid, p. 174.

27 Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 127-129.

kaimmakam in Belgrade while Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha was on the Vienna campaign. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, who returned to Edirne as third kubbe alti vizier, demanded to retire to escape the hatred directed by Kara İbrahim Pasha against the Köprülü family.²⁸ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha retired in 22 June 1684. He received the odjaklık revenues of the sanjaks of Kilis and Azaz,²⁹ which were in South-eastern Anatolia.³⁰

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha remained in İstanbul until his appointment to the Sakız Muhafizliği in December 1685. The alliance formed by Austria, Poland and Venice after the second Vienna defeat had put the Ottomans into a difficult position in their European lands and in the Mediterranean. The capture of Crete deprived the Venetians of a crucial base of in the Mediterranean. The Venetians formed an alliance with Austria against the Ottoman State in order to profit from the second Vienna defeat. Before this alliance, the confiscation of goods in certain Venetian galleons by order of grand vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha and the reprisals exacted by Venice against almost one thousand muslim traders had escalated tension between the two states and eventually caused a war. Venice procured ships from the Papacy, Florence, Malta, Genoa and Spain, and then attacked the Ottoman lands of the Dalmatian Coast with approximately one hundred ships. This war spread first to Morea Peninsula and later to the Aegean Sea.

The success of the Venetians in the Morea and in the Aegean Sea compelled the Ottomans to seek new military solutions for these regions. First of all, it was decided that it would be appropriate to appoint serdars from among the people who were familiar with those regions, who were well equipped, who had sufficient information about war and defence tactics and who had also experienced naval warfare. Additionally, they had to be able to furnish troops and military equipment. The intention of the Venetians was to prevent the Ottomans from reaching the Mediterranean by seizing Chios Island and the Dardanelles Straits. Thus, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, who was extremely familiar with Venice and the Mediterranean Sea, was appointed muhafiz of

28 Deftardar, *Zübde*, p. 175.

29 Azaz (Azez) was the sanjak between Kilis and Aleppo.

30 Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 129; Odjaklık was the state revenues assigned alienated in perpetuity for a specific purpose, in particular, for troop wages.

Chios in December 1685,³¹ and in March 1686 he was appointed guard of the Dardanelles.³²

The war on the Austria front continued to be unfavourable to Ottomans for three years and the Austrian army moved into the Balkans. After the vizierate of Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, the sultan had not been able to find any grand vizier as talented as those in the Köprülü family. Grand viziers Kara İbrahim (16 December 1683) and then Süleyman Pasha (December 1685) were reluctant to go on campaign and appointed others as commander in their place. Furthermore, the sultan himself had neglected state affairs and was busy with the organization of hunting parties. Eventually, at the insistence of the odjak aghas, Sultan Mehmed IV appointed a new Grand Vizier, Sarı Süleyman Pasha, and sent him to the Austrian front as serdar in March 1686.³³ Nevertheless, the Ottoman army experienced a disastrous defeat in the vicinity of Budin, losing fortresses that were extremely important, such as Szeged, Simintorna, Peçuy, Koloszvar, Siklosh, and also part of Transylvania. The army was already furious with sultan, and a rebellion transpired on the pretext that the janissaries did not receive their pay after the Budin defeat. Grand vizier Sarı Süleyman Pasha fled to Belgrade on 29 August 1687.³⁴

From that date onwards, the Köprülü family again began to take an active role in the events. The Odjak Aghas appointed as kaimmakam Siyavuş Pasha, who was the son-in-law of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, after the grand vizier abandoned the army and fled to Belgrade.³⁵

The Odjak Aghas who gathered in kaimmakam Siyavuş Pasha's tent wrote a report to the Sultan informing him of the state of the army and of Sarı Süleyman Pasha and what he had committed. The Sultan endorsed Siyavuş Pasha as kaimmakam when the report reached İstanbul. The Sultan ordered the army to stay in Belgrade by stressing that the army must protect the borders against the enemy. However, the army that had received its first concession from the Sultan in the endorsement of Siyavuş Pasha's kaimmakamlik gave

31 Ibid, p. 217-223.

32 Ibid, p. 230; Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 212-214.

33 Ibid, p. 214-215.

34 Ibid, p. 220, 232-233.

35 Ibid, p. 234.

notice that they refused to stay in Belgrade and also that they demanded the dismissal of the fugitive grand vizier Süleyman Pasha. Otherwise, they would march to İstanbul in order to conclude the matter. Thus Siyavush Pasha, son-in-law of Köprülü, was appointed as grand vizier.³⁶

At the same time, Receb Pasha, kaimmakam of İstanbul and supporter of the previous grand vizier, changed his attitude towards the army. He knew that the army was willing to dethrone Mehmed IV and to enthrone Süleyman II. Receb Pasha's aim was to enthrone Mustafa II, the son of Mehmed IV. He hoped thus was to eliminate the pressure of the army, to prove that the change of ruler had been taken place according to the will of the center, not that of the army. He was also quite close to Mustafa II.³⁷ He held covert discussions with Sheyhülislam Ankaralı Mehmed Efendi and demanded a fetwa from him. The sultan gave an order for the imprisonment and execution of the kaimmakam Receb Pasha when he heard of his intentions. Receb Pasha became aware of the situation and fled.³⁸

The sultan had to choose carefully the person who would succeed the dismissed Kaimmakam Receb Pasha. The rebellion had not come to an end despite the fact that the army's every demand had been met and the army had moved from Belgrade to Edirne. Sultan Mehmed IV foresaw that if the army could reach Edirne, it could also come to İstanbul. He appointed Dardanelles muhafizi Köprülü Fazıl Mustafa Pasha as kaimmakam of İstanbul expecting him to ward off the advancing army and to resolve the situation. He thought Fazıl Mustafa Pasha would have great influence both on the army and on the new grand vizier Siyavuş Pasha who was also the son-in-law of the Köprülü family. An urgent firman was issued on 8 October 1687 for the immediate return of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha to İstanbul.³⁹ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha soon arrived in İstanbul for consultations with the sultan, who attempted to win him over through eloquence and by giving him gifts to compensate for his treatment of Köprülüzade in the past.⁴⁰

36 Ibid, p. 240-242.

37 Hammer, *Osmanlı Devleti Tarihi*, p. 148-151.

38 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 245-246.

39 Ibid, p. 246-247.

40 Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 274.

Meanwhile the padishah had sent Haseki Musa Pasha with a Hatt-ı Hümayun and the head of former grand vizier Sarı Süleyman Pasha to meet the army that returned to Edirne. In this Hatt-ı Hümayun the sultan stated that he had met the demands of the army, that he promised not to hunt again and that henceforth he would concentrate solely on affairs of state; he ordered the army to quarter in Edirne. However, the army was determined to make the sultan abrogate his throne, and responded that it was too late, that he had neglected state affairs because of his extravagant and extreme interest in hunting. They also indicated that the sultan had put his own enjoyment and pleasure before the demands of government, which had brought the country to its current situation; they sent Haseki Musa back to İstanbul with new demands. Their demands were the dismissal of the *Kızlar Aghası* and *Bostancibashi* and the confiscation of their properties.⁴¹ Haseki Musa Pasha was brought into the presence of the Sultan by the kaimmakam of İstanbul Fazıl Mustafa Pasha when he came to İstanbul. Sultan Mehmed IV expeditiously accepted the army's demands by dismissing and expelling both the *Kızlar Aghası* and *Bostancibashi* and also by confiscating their properties on 22 October 1687. Yet, dissension continued in the army in Edirne about whether to march on İstanbul. Part of the army, including the grand vizier wanted to obey the orders and stay in Edirne, and later continue the struggle against Austria, Venetia and Poland that threatened the Ottoman lands. Another party, especially the levends, were landless and unemployed persons who went on campaign as common soldiers, and they were eager to march on İstanbul and to dethrone Mehmed IV. The levends expressed their discontent by throwing stones at the tent of the grand vizier,⁴² who could do nothing in the face of these threats and sent a covert report explaining the situation in Edirne to the sultan.⁴³ The sultan replied in a Hatt-ı Hümayun, saying that he fully understood the demands of the army and agreed to abdicate in favour of his son Mustafa.⁴⁴ The army arrived from Edirne to Solakçeşme, and in response to the sultan's Hatt-ı Hümayun that reached them in Silivri, they prepared a report addressed to all ulema, ayan, eşraf and odjak aghas in İstanbul about the dethronement of Mehmed IV. The report was sent

41 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 249.

42 Ibid, p. 251.

43 Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 290.

44 Ibid, p. 290.

clandestinely to the kaimmakam of İstanbul, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, on 7 November 1687.⁴⁵

It would be pertinent to indicate two important points related to the dethronement of Mehmed IV. The first is the role of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha. He clearly supported the dethronement and played an important role in the event. The report that declared the dethronement of the padishah was secretly sent to him: if Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had been against the dethronement, he would have conveyed that to the padishah, who would then have taken the necessary retaliation measures. Further, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha enthroned Süleyman II through organizing a furtive meeting with the *ulema* and *askerî erkan*. Furthermore, when Fazıl Mustafa Pasha opposed the rebellion of the army in İstanbul, the Odjak aghas indicated that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had always been allied with them.⁴⁶

A covert meeting was organized in the palace of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha with the participation of the sheyhülislam and all the ulema, sekbanbaşı, *odjak ihtiyarları* and important members of the army. Kaim-makam Fazıl Mustafa Pasha read them the report and explained the situation. At the end of the meeting, they agreed that Mehmed IV must abdicate his throne and that Süleyman II would succeed him.⁴⁷ Statesmen in Ayasofya went to the palace and on 9 November 1687 enthroned Süleyman, brother of Mehmed IV, who was in Shimshirlik in the Topkapı palace.⁴⁸

The army remained in Çırpıcı Çayırı near the İstanbul after the dethronement. Siyavuş Pasha who had no influence over the army thought that the army would dissolve when ulufes were allocated. However, things did not turn out as he had planned. Aghas and zorbhas, who were eager for power, entered İstanbul, janissaries occupied their barracks and sipahis and zorbhas occupied the palace of İbrahim Pasha. There was not sufficient money in the treasury for the monetary gifts, baksheesh, traditionally distributed on the

45 Ibid, p. 295.

46 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 273-274, "... vezir-i a'zam bizlerin bir tarafken taraf-ı hilâfımızda olmağa kadir ve meydan-ı muhâlefetde bu denlü 'arz-ı hüner edecek meretebe bahâdır olmayub, bu ana dek ittifâkımıza mugâyir hareketden hazer-i tehâşî üzere iken ..."

47 Ibid, p. 252-254.

48 Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 295-298.

accession of new sultan. The janissaries looted the markets demanding the *cülus baksheesh* and salary raises named *terakki*. Grand vizier Siyavuş Pasha invited the Odjak Aghas and other rebellion leaders named Zorba Başıs to the palace and explained the state of the treasury. He said that the state could pay its debts except the *cülus baksheesh* and he added that their *terakkis* would increase a certain amount. Additionally, he indicated he would resign from the vizierate if they did not accept this condition. The janissaries accepted this proposal, but it was heard that certain zorbas were executed by the janissary aghas when they accepted their salaries. Then the troops revolted again.⁴⁹

Köprülü Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was responsible for withholding the *cülus baksheesh* and eliminating the zorba leaders. It is obvious that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had a strong position at the center of government. How did he acquire this strong position and how did he manage to carry out this intentions?

The foremost factor in acquiring this strong position and in turning events to his advantage was the great support of the ulema. He always used the ulema as a power base during the performance of his duties since he had been chosen as *kaimmakam* due to the support of the ulema. Apart from the ulema, another crucial factor in his success was the his brother-in-law Siyavuş Pasha. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was able to make Siyavuş Pasha accept his every demand. He saw Siyavuş Pasha as the slave of his father Köprülü Mehmed and he imposed all his demands as orders to Siyavuş Pasha.⁵⁰ The Ottoman army had opted for Siyavuş Pasha as grand vizier and as a person who would accept their every demand when the army revolted in Budin. Events proved that them right because they had made him accept their every decision. Thus, Mehmed IV had appointed Fazıl Mustafa Pasha as *kaimmakam*, expecting that he might have a

49 Ibid, p. 310-311; Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 268-269.

50 Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 318, "Vezir-i a'zam Siyavuş Paşa Abaza olmakla sadedil ve sade akıl bir adam idi, hall-i akd elinde olmayub zimâm-ı hükümet Yeniçeri ve Sipah zorbaların elinde olub heman kendü uyuk(?) mesâbesinde idi. Menâsib-i ilmiyye ve seyfiyye mezbûrların re'yiyle tevcih olunduğundan gayri vezir-i sâni Köprülü oğlu vezir Fazıl Mustafa Paşa külli umûra müdahale edüb cülûsa sebeb ben oldum deyü vezirliği evvel edüb kimseye söz seyletmez oldu. "Babam kölesidir" deyüb defaatile "be hey Abaza çok söyleme, şunu buyurun" der idi ve devlete pençe vurub sadra geçmek şirki ile âleme fitneler bırakub halkı birbirine katub kul beynine tefrika düşürdü. Vezir-i a'zamı çuvaldız gibi sokub bu eşkiyayı niceye dek yüz verirsin? Bunları birer takrib ile İstanbul'dan dağıt tedrîc ile haklarından gel..."

positive impact both on the grand vizier and on the army, largely due to his kin relationship with the grand vizier. According to Fındıklılı Silahtar Mehmed, a point appreciated by Mehmed IV was the relationship between Fazıl Mustafa Pasha and Siyavuş Pasha, and it is obvious that he was right in this judgement.⁵¹

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had great influence over both grand vizier Siyavuş Pasha and the new sultan Süleyman II, who came to the throne as the result of a covert meeting organized by Fazıl-Mustafa Pasha. If this meeting had not been covert Süleyman could not have reached the throne. Furthermore, according to Silahtar's history which was used as one of the main sources of this study, if the palace had known of the covert meeting, Süleyman Pasha would have been executed. The new sultan did not have any experience of government. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha demonstrated his influence over the grand vizier and sultan through dismissals and new appointments. In the same way, dangerous persons were expelled from İstanbul and officers that were close to Fazıl Mustafa Pasha were appointed to the administration. The appointment of Harputlu Ali Agha as Janissary Agha exemplified this policy. This situation produced an adverse reaction among the members of the army in İstanbul.

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, due to his appointments and especially due to the execution of certain rebels by the Janissary Agha, had lost his post of kaimmakamlik. If the sultan had not supported him, he probably would have been executed. Rebels began to perceive Fazıl Mustafa Pasha as the cause of the treatment they received. They requested a fetwa from Sheyhülislam Debbağzade Mehmed Efendi for the execution of Köprülüzade, but could not achieve their aim. The Padishah, who grasped the seriousness of the situation, removed vizier Fazıl Mustafa Pasha from İstanbul for a short time.⁵² Köprülü-zade's new post was the Dardanelles Muhafizlighi granted. 10 February 1688.⁵³ His appointments were removed from their posts after the exile of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha to Dardanelles and the persons supported by the rebels were re-appointed.

51 Ibid, p. 318.

52 *Silahdar Tarihi*, *Zübde-i Vekaiyat* and *Tarih-i Silsile-i Köprülü-zade* underscore the fact that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was a vizier although he had been dismissed from his post of kaim-makamlik in order to appease the rebels.

Although Fazıl Mustafa Pasha left İstanbul and the Sheyhülislam who did not give the execution fatwa was dismissed, the janissaries continued their rebellion. Rebel leaders and rebels could not be mollified and they made new demands even as their every demand was met. The sultan issued a firman for their disbandment.⁵⁴ This firman was its effective in quelling the rebellion. It was decided in a discussion among the grand vizier, the janissary aghasi, and the odjak ihtiyarları, that İstanbul could only be saved from the rebels through a military campaign. Preparations began for the campaign but the rebels became aware of the situation and initiated a new rebellion. Finally, by notifying that they did not support the grand vizierate of Siyavuş Pasha, they plundered his palace, executed the grand vizier and his wife, and took their daughters captive. This action was not merely against Siyavuş Pasha, but also against the ordinary people and especially against the esnaf. As stated above, this anarchy was extremely costly to the esnaf class. During the rebellion, while certain rebels were looting the grand vizier's palace, others began to plunder the esnaf's shops. There was also resentment among the people who experienced five months of rebellion. This anarchy led growing numbers of people in İstanbul to revolt against the janissaries. This insurrection against the janissaries was also supported by the palace administration: the sacred banner of the prophet was paraded, and rebel leaders were executed. Thus the rebellion was stamped out and the sultanic authority was reestablished.

While these developments occurred in İstanbul, Austria and Venice were advancing into Ottoman lands. After the defeat at Budin in the late 1687, first Eszek in October 1687 then Valpova, Petervaradin (14 December 1687), Eğri, Solnok, Lipve, İstolni and finally Belgrade (8 September 1688) were occupied by the Austrians. In the face of this situation Yegen Osman Pasha was appointed as commander of the Ottoman army in order to hold back the advancing Austrian army. However, the Ottomans had to withdraw because their army was in disarray and they lacked logistic support against the Austrians. Kanin Fortress in Bosnia was occupied by the Austrians. Furthermore, new appointments and the general call-up, *nefir-i amm*, were not

53 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 273-274.

54 Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 324-325.

sufficient to remedy the situation.⁵⁵ The Ottomans could resist Poland, which intended to recapture the Podolia region through the support of the Crimean Tatar forces.⁵⁶ As far as the Venetians were concerned, they dominated a great part of the Morea Peninsula, Albania, Bosnia and the Aegean Sea. Muslims and some non-muslim subjects of that region had begun to migrate towards Anatolia to escape enemy persecution. On the other hand, certain non-muslim subjects supported the enemy.⁵⁷ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha who had lost his office of Sadaret Kaimmakamlighi and had been deliberately re-appointed Dardanelles Muhafizlighi, was deliberately appointed to this post by the sultan. As stated above, Venice was paramount in the Morea and in Aegean Sea. Their purpose was to capture the Dardanelles after seizing Bozcaada and Gökçeada islands, which guarded the approaches to the Dardanelles. Köprülüzade was one of the statesmen who was extremely familiar with the Venetians and with that region. He had been present at the Kandiya Siege where he had become familiar with Venetian war tactics. Additionally, during his previous Muhafizlig of the Dardanelles, before he became familiar with kaimmakam office in İstanbul, he had become familiar with the region and understood the need for a military force to be based there. He issued new military regulations for the Dardanelles in a short period of time.

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was also appointed as Hanya Muhafizi in March 1688.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, Kandiya Muhafizi Zülfikar Pasha was executed by janissaries. Köprülü-zade was appointed as Kandiya Muhafizi to restore order in Kandiya and to resist the Venetians, who were eager to benefit from the lack of authority in June 1688.⁵⁹ But Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was immediately appointed to Chios Muhafizlighi, because the Venetians had attacked Eğriboz in December of the same year. Consequently, he had become closer to İstanbul.

The Ottoman state was faced with the possibility of losing a great part of Rumelia. Once Morea was lost, rebellions spread in Albania and Serbia, the enemy was advancing towards the Balkans, and muslim subjects had begun to

55 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 279-290.

56 Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 426-433.

57 Ibid, p. 381.

58 Ibid, p. 350.

59 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 290.

leave Sofia. The enemy had arrived near Skopje, and for a strong grand vizier was needed to command the army. Consultations on the current situation were held in Edirne between Sultan Süleyman II, Sheyhülislam Debbağ-zade Mehmed Efendi and the other ulema. In this meeting, the failure of the Ottomans in Rumelia and the collaboration of non-muslim subjects with the enemy were attributed to the incompetence of the grand viziers. They also made clear that the situation would worsen if the necessary measures were not taken. Thus, they sought a grand vizier who was familiar with state affairs, who had military knowledge and experience, and who also would be able to resolve financial problems, as well as provide the old sound and well-structured system of administration. At the end of the discussion, it was decided that Chios Muhafizi Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was eligible for the office and Fazıl Pasha was invited to İstanbul in a Hatt-ı Hümayun dated 9 November 1689.⁶⁰

Why had Fazıl Mustafa Pasha been chosen as the grand vizier? What were the reasons? Did these reasons stem from the character, talent or education of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha or from another factors? As stated before Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had studied Islamic sciences during the vizierate of his father Köprülü Mehmed, he had learned about military matters during the vizierate of his elder brother Fazıl Ahmed, and he had also become familiar with state affairs and bureaucracy during that of his brother-in-law Siyavuş Pasha. Additionally, he had not resided in one location all his life, but had served the state in many different parts of the empire. He understood state problems in Anatolia and Rumelia. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was chosen as grand vizier thanks to his education and experience.

Certainly, there were other statesmen with a very sound education, who were as talented and experienced as Fazıl Mustafa Pasha. But what was the difference between Fazıl Mustafa Pasha and other such statesmen? It would be again pertinent to answer this question by emphasizing the education and entourage of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha. As stated, He had been close to the ulema. He had spent a great deal of his life studying Islamic sciences. Therefore, the ulema supported Fazıl Mustafa Pasha and had proved their support both in his appointment as kaimmakam and also during his kaimmakamlık of İstanbul. For example, when the soldiers who rebelled in İstanbul had demanded a fatwa

60 Ibid, p. 339-341.

from the sheyhülislam Debbâğ-zade Mehmed Efendi for the execution of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, the sheyhülislam refused that demand. As indicated in Silahtar, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha became grand vizier by dint of the support of the ulema. The intention of the ulema was to realize their demands and gain power by providing an important post of state for one of their colleagues.

Köprülüzade came to Edirne on 11 November 1689, when the Hatt-ı Hümayun reached him. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was welcomed by Sheyhülislam Debbâğzade Mehmed Efendi, the kadi and Kaimmakam *muallim-i Sultani* and *Sadreyin Efendis*, *Nakibü'l-eşraf Efendi* who resided in Edirne and *müderrisin efendis* and members of diwan. First of all, they went to the pavilion of the Kaimmakam Pasha and later Köprülüzade visited the sultan and received the imperial seal, *mühter-i hümayun*. Köprülüzade Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was chosen for the office of grand vizierate when he was 52 years old.⁶¹

PERIOD OF THE GRAND VIZIERATE

Köprülüzade Fazıl Mustafa Pasha first of all handled the most difficult problems that the state had to face when he inaugurated his new post as a grand vizier. Financial and military problems had first priority. He began to work to resolve these problems.

Abolition of Wine and Arak Tax

The war had continued after the Vienna defeat and therefore expenditures of the state had increased. Because of this, statesmen before Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had imposed several new taxes in order to balance the budget. These taxes were *Sefer-i İmdadiye*, *Masarif-i Seferiyye*, *Sürsat*⁶² and taxes on Wine and Arak were imposed on non-muslim subjects. A firman was issued to collect a tax called *hamr ü arak* on alcoholic drinks produced by non-muslim Ottoman subjects and as well as on drinks sold by foreign traders in Ottoman lands, in order to eliminate the treasury's problems caused by the prolonged war. Heretofore, tobacco brought by foreign traders had not been taxed. It was decided to take 10 akça from tobacco known as "Yenice" brought by foreign

61 Ibid, p. 342.

62 Ibid, p. 221.

traders, and 8 akça from tobacco of "Kırcali" together with the hamr ü arak tax. These taxes were collected in the customs of İstanbul. This additional tax levied on non-muslim subjects put them in a very difficult situation and encouraged them to collaborate with the enemy after the Vienna defeat.⁶³ Köprülü Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had observed this situation during his office in Rumelia and in the Aegean islands, and in an *adaletname* which was expeditiously issued when he became grand vizier, he emphasized the fact that alcoholic drinks were forbidden, *haram*, according to the Islamic religion and thus taxes collected from a forbidden goods were also forbidden; consequently, he banned the consumption of alcohol in the Ottoman state and also the sale of drinks imported by foreign traders to Ottoman lands. At the same time he abrogated the tax of hamr ü arak collected from non-muslim subjects.⁶⁴ Furthermore, Küfri Ahmed Efendi, who was the customs official responsible for imposing that tax, and who was held responsible for causing non-muslim subjects to collaborate with the enemy, was executed.⁶⁵

However, it is difficult to determine to what extent this ban was implemented to. It was difficult for Ottoman officials to exercise control over the prohibition throughout the whole empire. Prohibition could only be imposed in the great cities, such as İstanbul. Several documents show that the Ottomans attempted to impose the prohibition on alcohol. For instance, there was a complaint regarding the opening of a saloon, *meyhane*, by a non-muslim near a mosque in the Kasımpaşa district of İstanbul. The diwan demanded an inquiry and it was decided to close the saloon and to punish the owner, if the complaint proved accurate.⁶⁶

However, there is an important point to mention in this subject. The prohibition on the consumption of alcoholic drink must not be confused with drink production. In modern books on Ottoman history, this period is mentioned as if drink production was prohibited in the whole country. This is false. There was no decision about prohibition of drink production in

63 Ibid, p. 298-299.

64 Ibid, p. 345. Ali Emiri, II. Süleyman, no: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23.

65 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 344.

66 MD 99, p. 43.

adaletnames and firmans, merely about the consumption of drinks and also about the abolition of the tax of hamr ü arak. Many Ottoman subjects in Rumelia and the Aegean islands depended for their subsistence on the production and sale of wine and raki. Wine also had a religious function for christian subjects. Therefore, it was not possible for Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, who was eager to re-gain the support of non-muslim subjects who are inclined to collaborate with the enemy, to prohibit production.⁶⁷

New Appointments and Assignments

The second most important problem was the military situation that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha faced when he became grand vizier. As stated earlier, a great part of Rumelia had been lost and an order had been issued for muslim subjects to evacuate Sofia. The Ottomans could resist Poland with the support of the Crimean army. However, the Austrian and Venetian armies were advancing in Ottoman lands with great success. The sultan and his statesmen were desperate and janissaries were horrified at these developments. None of the measures taken by Ottomans -Sultan Süleyman had joined the campaign as leader of his army- could stave off the defeat and withdrawal of the Ottoman army before the advancing enemy.

Thus, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha dismissed the officers appointed by the former grand vizier such as kaim-makam, *Tezkire-i evvel*, *vekilharç*, *janissary katibi*, *defterdar*, *ruzmançeci*, *cizye muhasebecisi*, janissary aghasi and the others in the interests of greater efficiency, and productivity and to allow quicker decision-making. He appointed officers who were close to him in place of the old ones. These new appointments were effected not only in the center but in the provinces as well.

Decisions regarding military assignments are one of the most salient issues in the *mühimme defters*.⁶⁸ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha carried out these assignments before embarking on the great campaign against Austria in order to prevent further deterioration in the army. It seems that these assignments were made in

67 Ali Emiri, II. Süleyman, no: 18, 19, 20, 23.

68 Atilla Çetin, *Başbakanlık Arşiv Kılavuzu*, İstanbul, 1979; *Mühimme defters* in which the decision concerning the state in the first rank were recorded, contain the Fazıl Mustafa Pasha period in defters numbered as 99, 100, 101.

a systematic way, office holders generally being transferred from Anatolia to Rumelia. Namely, a beylerbegi, sandjakbegi, kale muhafizi or another state officer who had a post in any location in Anatolia had been appointed to a region or fortress in Rumelia with a new post.⁶⁹ The reason that assignments were generally from Anatolia to Rumelia was the demands of the continuing war in Rumelia. Assignments were not solely from Anatolia to Rumelia, but a commander in Rumelia could also be assigned to another location in Rumelia.⁷⁰ There were also assignments from Rumelia to Anatolia.⁷¹ Some of these assignments were permanent and the others were provisional. Provisional assignments were generally carried out to support the immediate needs of the army, and those who were temporarily assigned had to return to their former posts after the completion of their duties. Beylerbegis, sandjak begis, and zeamet and timar holders who were temporarily assigned went to their new posts with the rank of retinue, *kapi halkı*. If assigned commanders held office in Anatolia, or elsewhere, they had to come to Edirne to discuss their new responsibilities with the grand vizier and then to move to their new duties after receiving their document of reassignment, named *tezkire*. Moreover, when beylerbegis, sandjak begis or fortress commanders were assigned to a new post, their posts had to be filled by other assigned officers. For instance, when Bekir Pasha, the muhafiz of Midilli, was invited to Edirne, prior to taking up his new office Acem Mehmed Pasha the Bursa mutasarrıfı, was assigned to his vacant position as Midilli muhafizi.⁷² Similar transactions are encountered in the three mühimme defteri referred to above. Military assignments concerned not only land forces, but naval forces as well.⁷³

Preparations for Campaign

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, who inaugurated his grand vizierate by abrogating certain taxes and by carrying out new appointments, continued his war preparations. He conducted a census of janissaries and proclaimed a general

69 MD 99, p. 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15.

70 MD 99, p. 7, 13; MD 100, p. 104, 118, 188.

71 MD 99, p. 15, 21, 23.

72 MD 99, 7, 8.

73 MD 99, p. 104; Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 483-489.

levy for the defence of Islam (*Nefir-i amm*) in order to realize the full potential of the state's military resources. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha appointed Zağarcı Eğinli Mehmed Agha as *Kul Kethüdasi* to make a census of the odjaks as soon as he became grand vizier. The purpose of the census was not only to have the number of janissaries, but also to eliminate illegal practices in the janissary odjak. There had not previously been any supervision or census in the janissary odjaks. Thus there were groups registered in the odjak who were not trained as janissaries such as farmers, artisans and others. The number of janissaries skyrocketed during the wars waged against Austria in the years 1593-1606. Although their number was 7.886 in 1527, it reached 37.627 in 1610.⁷⁴ This number had increased to 59.000 in 1688. As a result of the census, it was found that many dead janissaries were still on the payrolls and that retired janissaries received higher wages than the legal rate. The odjak was an unproductive institution and brought an enormous financial burden on state treasury. The state had experienced periods when it could not pay the wages of the janissaries which were due every three months. Had there been a new Sultan, the situation would have been worse, because the state was obliged to pay accession gifts to the janissaries. In order to pay accession gifts to the janissaries, the state had to impose extra taxes such as *avarız* or *cülus akçası* on its subjects, which caused great resentment. At the end of the inspection, those who were not active as janissaries were dismissed from the odjak. The salaries of false janissaries were abolished. As a consequence, the names of more than twenty thousand janissaries were erased from the *defters* and 100.000 kuruş revenue provided for the state treasury.⁷⁵ In this way, the real potential of the janissaries became apparent and the regional strength of the janissaries had been evaluated.

The General Levy for the defence of Islam, called *Nefir-i Amm*, was announced in the whole country once the janissaries had presented themselves for duty.⁷⁶ *Nefir-i amm* was a conscription encompassing all Ottoman

⁷⁴ Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600.", In *An Economic and Social History of The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, 9-409, Edited by Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert, Cambridge, 1994, p. 24.

⁷⁵ Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 489.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 57, 71, 77, 94, 116, 120, 128; MD 99, p. 71; MD 99, p. 120; MD 99, p. 77.

subjects.⁷⁷ The Ottoman state began to retreat following the great defeats in Rumelia after the Second Vienna Siege. The wars had not been waged only in one front but also in the Aegean, the Morea Peninsula and across Rumelia against the Venetians, Austrians and Polish. The enemy armies were in an advantageous position, both in the amount of soldiers and quantity of ammunition. When Fazıl Mustafa Pasha became grand vizier, the war had lasted for 6 years. More armed soldiers and ammunition were needed in order to resist the enemy. Thus, through a declaration of *nefir-i amm*, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha summoned janissaries, sipahis and silahtars and all adults for the war. The point that was underscored in the firmans issued by Fazıl Mustafa Pasha relating to the *nefir-i amm* was that the enemy army was eager to eliminate the Muslim Religion: This necessitated total participation of the soldiers and the *reaya* in the war. Every adult had to participate except the ill, disabled and the old persons. Those who did not would be executed. Those exempted would provide food for those who participated. In this way, the ill, disabled and the old persons who could not go to war were involved in the *nefir-i amm*. Moreover, officers and orders were sent to every *eyalet* to put the *nefir-i amm* into action.

Besides, all janissaries, sipahis and silahdars in the provinces were called to Edirne for the campaign that would commence in the spring of 1690. Firmans also indicated the number of janissaries in every *eyalet*, sandjak and fortress ordering that these janissaries come to Edirne under the command of the sandjak alaybegs. Pretexts of any kind would not even be discussed and if there were janissaries absent from the census to be conducted in Edirne, they would be dismissed from the odjak.⁷⁸

It is clear that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha himself took control of the janissary odjaks. The records indicate that the number and location of janissaries and ammunition were now known, which enabled immediate access to these resources. For instance, numbers of armourers and artillerymen needed for the campaign were easily found in the *defters*. It was also apparent that numerous armourers and artillerymen remained to guard the Aegean Islands, Rumelia and

⁷⁷ M. Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, p. 672.

⁷⁸ Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p., 8, 45, 80, 82, 86, 121; MD 99, p. 111; See also the others firmans in the MD 99 and MD 100.

some parts of Anatolia. The required number of armourer and artillerymen was determined and a firman issued for them to come to Edirne.⁷⁹ In addition to janissaries located in different places, janissaries whose names were erased from the rolls for any reason, such as those dismissed from the odjak, were summoned for the campaign, as were retired janissaries.⁸⁰

Yamaks, *Voynuks* and the other Ottoman subjects in the regions were used as local guards instead of janissaries who were summoned for the campaign. A division of *Yamaks* and *Voynuks* were also summoned to the campaign while other divisions performed the duty of local protection.⁸¹ It is understood that especially *Voynuks* were charged to protect areas where bandits and brigands were numerous.⁸²

It was also significant that the subject population also contributed to guarding certain locations. For instance, when janissaries, artillerymen and armourers in Eğriboz joined the campaign, reaya and janissaries whose name had been erased from the defters -*çalık janissaries*-, reentered the odjak and undertook the duty of defense of the islands under the command of a janissary serdar.⁸³

Soldiers in Egypt, Trablusgarb, Tunisia and Algeria eyalets were also summoned to the campaign. The call was both for the navy and the janissaries of these eyalets. The firmans show that the navy and soldiers of the above mentioned eyalets had participated in previous campaigns. Moreover, it was indicated that janissaries would be sent by warships from the named eyalets and that ships would be provided by the Ottoman navy in order to facilitate the transportation of troops. The main difference of the odjak janissaries in Egypt,

79 MD 99, p. 123: İstanköy: cebeci 150, topçu 30; Limni: cebeci 200, topçu 30; Midilli: cebeci 100, topçu 30; Kandiye: cebeci 200, topçu 100; Sakız: cebeci 50; Hanya: cebeci 200, topçu 100; Bozcaada: cebeci 200, topçu 50; Özi: cebeci 150, topçu 20; Resimo: cebeci 50, topçu 30; Bender: topçu 15; Kirman: cebeci 50, topçu 15; Kertaş: cebeci 50, topçu 30; Doğan geçidi: cebeci 80, topçu 40, Ardahan: cebeci 100; Nusret Kirman: cebeci 50, topçu 15.

80 MD 99, p. 102, 108, 109, 111.

81 MD 99, p. 27, 28, 170.

82 MD 99, p. 110, 170. Halil İnalçık, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600.", p. 91.

83 MD 99, p. 65, 82.

Trablusgarb, Tunisia and Algeria from those in other eyalets was that their expenditures and wages were paid in cash, as gold directly sent from the central treasury.⁸⁴

The reason for Venetian success in the Aegean Sea, the Morea and the Dalmatian coast against the Ottomans was that they possessed a more powerful navy. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha knew this well from his past experiences. Thus he took the initiative in order to render his navy more powerful. He began with new appointments in the navy as in the land forces. He aimed to create a strong navy through two new initiatives. First, he included in the navy soldiers from Trablusgarb, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria⁸⁵ Secondly, he built new warships. Kazas and villages from Kocaeli to Sinop were charged with the task of providing the necessary materials, especially wood and lumber.⁸⁶ Oarsmen were also needed in addition to the soldiers on the ships. Firmans sent to the kadis demanded that those guilty of crimes such as homicide were assigned to duty oarsmen.⁸⁷

In the Ottoman state the other groups encompassed in the general levy for the defence of Islam were fifty-eight different *Türkmen* and *Ekrad* tribes, named *aşiret*, in Anatolia⁸⁸ as well as *Yürüks* and some reaya of Rumelia. The Ottomans had an extremely well organized registration system. Through the census and inspection conducted in the janissary odjaks the numbers and location of all janissaries were recorded. The situation was the same for timarli sipahis defters of timars, zeamets which were frequently revised. Additionally, defters of mukataa and tahrir contained information about the military and financial potential of the state. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha benefited from these registers by using the reaya in the Ottoman empire as a military resource. Nomadic yürüks and ashirets were subordinate to a given mukataa and they were registered in mukataa defters. Thus, the number of ashiret and yürük could be established and it was hoped to find additional troops when needed. It

84 MD 99, p. 31, 33, 34, 35, 87, 93, 94, 95, 97, 104.

85 MD 99, p. 31, 34, 87, 93, 94, 95, 104.

86 BOA., Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi (KK) 2473, p. 32, 44, 48, 53, 67, 80, 82.

87 MD 99, p. 41, 72; İdris Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersane-i Amire*, Ankara, 1992, p. 102.

88 MD 99, p. 49-54, 138, 148.

is understood from the firmans sent to these groups that the number and location of Türkmen and Ekrad tribes and *yürük* were known where they located and tried to control especially during the war time by the governer. These firmans ordered that the required number of soldiers from a given ashiret must report for duty.

We see that 5.000 persons from Türkmen and Ekrad ashirets situated within Ottoman borders were demanded for the campaign. The number of Ekrad soldiers was 1760, and 3240 was that of Türkmen. We have information about how events developed after the firman and whether the 5.000 soldiers demanded went on campaign or not.⁸⁹

Most of this information is found in the *yoklama defters*. These defters provide the number of soldiers sent, the name of the soldier, his father's name, his town, village, neighbourhood and his guarantor.⁹⁰ It was indicated in the firmans and yoklama defters that each soldier participating in the campaign would be paid 50 kuruş. The Yeniil and Halep mukataa were to send the financial resources required. Kethüdas of every cemaat would receive these moneys and disburse it to the soldiers sent for the campaign.⁹¹ The soldier who would join the campaign had to visit the kadi or naib with his guarantor and to register his name and the name of his guarantor, and then he would be paid. This obliged the soldier to join the campaign. In general, soldiers were the guarantor of each other. Also, those who did not participate in the campaign or were *boybegi* for the whole group sent by him, could be guarantor.⁹²

Ekrad and Türkmen soldiers had to move towards Edirne (with their defter) under the flag of their boybegi once these procedures had been completed. After arriving in Edirne on the basis of these defters, and soldiers who were absent or present were again recorded in the defters. In the same defters, there were records about the amount of food received by ashirets and where they were ordered to serve. Some Türkmen and Ekrad ashirets sent the number of troops demanded from them, but some of them were not able to

89 MD 99, p. 48-56.

90 Maliyeden Müdevver Defteri (MAD) 608.

91 Ibid, 44; MD 99, p. 56, 57, 115.

92 MAD 608.

satisfy the demands of the state. Some soldiers deserted after their departure for Edirne, and their pay was demanded from their guarantor.⁹³

Yürüks and some other reaya were also included in the nefir-i amm for the campaign. A firman was sent to Yürüks when they joined the campaign. This firman explained the problems besetting the state and the need for more soldiers for campaign. It also stressed the number of soldiers that a sandjak would send.⁹⁴ The recruitment of yürüks was rather different than those of other groups. Yürüks were recruited with the undertaking that they would obtain an exemption from taxes. Yürüks paid taxes to the state such as *resm-i ağnam*, *resm-i zemin*, *resm-i bennak*, *yave akçası*, *bad-ı heva*, *tekalif-i örfiye* and *şakka*.⁹⁵ The food needed for Yürüks was provided by Yürüks of certain *kazas* who could not join the campaign due to their old age, illness or disability.⁹⁶ Furthermore, in certain *kazas*, Yürüks were exempted from taxes if they provided a given number of soldiers or provided the food needed for the soldiers whom they sent.⁹⁷ In certain *kazas* there was a different practice. The state charged every two or three yürük *hane* households with the duty of providing one soldier and also ensuring the food for that soldier under the tax of *avarız*.⁹⁸ Yürüks who held offices such as *yamak*, *yağcı*, *küreci* in the wakfs of Sultan Bayezid, Gazi Evranos and Sultan Han in Filibe, Gümülcine, Tatarpazarı, Çırpan, Zağra-yı Atik, Zağra-yı Cedid, Uzunca Ova, Hasköy and Çirmen were also called up for their new duties.⁹⁹

When it organised a campaign, the Ottoman state aimed at eliminating problems within the state through another transaction which allowed control over certain groups who threatened public order and peace in certain regions. For instance, the state had called up *Sekbans* and *Sarıcas*¹⁰⁰ from Anatolia and also Yürüks who were *haydut* and *serkeş* in Karadağ area indicating that if they

93 Ibid, p. 37.

94 MD 99, p. 137, 138, 151, 157.

95 Halil İnalçık, "Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rüsümü", *Bellekten* 23 (1959), p. 575-610.

96 MD 99, p. 136, 156.

97 MD 99, p. 153, 156.

98 MD 99, p. 77, 120.

99 MD 99, p. 166.

100 MD 99, p. 91, 106, 110, 112, 137.

joined the campaign, they would not be punished.¹⁰¹ The nefir-i 'amm demanded that every able-bodied man participate in the campaign against the "infidels".¹⁰²

The procurement of essentials such as wheat, barley, and meat, in advance of and during campaign was of vital importance. It was also important to find secure locations to store the provisions and to secure the stations (*menzils*) and roads for the soldiers. Vehicles were needed to transport these provisions to the necessary *menzils* where they were needed. The necessary provisions had to be provided by Rumelian *kazas*. These *kazas* were as follows: Rodoscuk, Malkara, Tekirdağ, Vize, Cisir-i Mustafa Paşa, Baba-yı Atik, Baba-yı Cedid, İpsala, Ferecik, İneçik, Keşan, Bekarhisarı, Eylür(?) Filibe, Tatarpazarı, Kırkkilise, Hayrabolu, Çirmen, Zağra-yı Cedid, Zağra-yı Atik, Gümülcine, Yenice-i Kızılağaç, Akçakızanlık, Yenice-i Karasu, Hasköy, Elçelebi(?), Sultanyeri, Silistre, Çardak, Osman Pazarı, Pravadi, Varna, Hazergrad, Balçık, Mangalya, Hacıoğlu Pazarı, Tekfurgölü, Babadagh, Havas Mahmud Paşa, Bergos, Saray, İnoz, Kili, İsmail Geçidi, İsakçı ve İbrail, Uludere, Kınalı, Payaslı, Saruhanbeyli, Ruscuk, Zıştov and Yerköy.¹⁰³ Firmans indicated the amount of wheat and barley a given *kaza* should send to a named *menzil*.¹⁰⁴ There were also officers from the center named as *zahire* buyers (*mübayaacılar*) whose duty was to buy and send provisions to the *menzils*.¹⁰⁵ The state collected provisions in three different ways. First, provisions were bought with money sent directly by the state treasury¹⁰⁶ or through the transfer of a given *mukataa* revenue¹⁰⁷ or from the *sürsat zahiresi* tax collected from the *reaya*.¹⁰⁸ Secondly, provisions were collected in place of *avarız* and other *örfi* taxes. Thirdly provisions were taken as *ayni*, namely as *öşr* from the produced *zahires*. The state was also concerned that prices of provisions to be bought not

101 MD 99, p. 137.

102 MD 99, p. 120, 128, 152, 158.

103 MD 99, p. 118, 144, 150, 192.

104 MD 99, p. 92, 150.

105 MD 99, p. 118, 144.

106 MD 99, p. 118; Ali Emiri, II. Süleyman, p. 183, 191.

107 MD 99, p. 44, 80.

108 MD 99, p. 45, 83.

be high. Firmans notified that persons who increased prices could be punished if it was necessary.

Roads, Bridges, Menzils and Vehicles of Transportation

It is obvious that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha wanted to ensure to the regularity, sufficiency and security of the roads and menzils from where the needs of the army would be met during the campaign. Many bridges, passes and important thoroughfares had been left undefended and neglected due to war; bandits and brigands were ubiquitous in mountainous and woodland areas. Hence, the first task of officers was to provide security by cleaning these roads, important thoroughfares, bridges and waystations of bandits and also by punishing villages that collaborated with the enemy.¹⁰⁹ Security could only be achieved by appointing more officers in those locations, by fortifying roads, bridges, provisions granaries and by the establishment of new granaries and bridges.

Three groups of soldiers were charged with this security function. First, reaya near derbends, bridges or menzils were exempted from taxes and *Voynuks* and *Martolos* were appointed as guards. Secondly, the janissaries from the center and some part of the *Yürüks* of Rumelia were assigned as guards. Third, on rare occasions, private soldiers were hired as guards by the villagers.

The restoration of roads, bridges and granaries used by the army had great importance for both pre-campaign preparations and also during the campaign. As stated above food was bought before the army set out on campaign and this food had to be transported apace to the menzils to be stored there. By the same token, roads, bridges and menzils had to be secure and regulated to ensure ease of transport. Therefore bridges were overhauled and new bridges were built. Menzils were restored and new granaries that would meet the army's demand were established. Moreover, through new firmans sent to certain kazas carpenters and masons and the necessary materials were provided.¹¹⁰

Another preparation for the campaign was the procurement and transportation of the food to the menzils. The transportation of the period depended on

109 MD 99, p. 72, 162, 163.

110 MD 99, p. 92, 118, 150.

camel, horse, oxen and ships. Our records show that there were not sufficient pack-animals for transportation in the menzils themselves. Many of them had been taken away from the menzils during the war and had not been brought back. Therefore the state collected pack-animals from the reaya. Firmans sent to Anatolia and Rumelia indicated that animals should not be used by the reaya for other purposes except the transportation of zahire and horses should not be removed from the menzils.¹¹¹ The necessary pack-animals were provided in two ways. First and most frequently payment was made to the reaya who owned the animal, or secondly the state rented horses and camels especially from Yürüks in order to transport the zahire to the menzils. Waterborne transport was provided in two ways: first, on ships owned by the state, especially in the Black Sea and in the Danube River; and secondly, boats on the Danube River were rented from reaya. Sea and river transportation was easier than land. Provisions were transported to the ports by pack-animals and then brought to the nearest menzils and to the most suitable places along the Danube River by barge and boat. From here the provisions were transported to the menzils by animals.¹¹²

The First Austrian Campaign and Re-Conquests

Austrians and Venetians in Rumelia, Morea and the Aegean Sea continued their successes while the Ottomans were engaged in preparations for the campaign. The appointments made by Fazıl Mustafa Pasha as soon as he became grand vizier were not sufficient although they partly provided the necessary security. Kanije fortress surrendered to Austria in April 1690 after four years of resistance. The migration issue was also a crucial subject. Austria had become dominant in Rumelia against the Ottoman army, especially by capturing the Niş fortress. A great many muslim families began to migrate towards Anatolia as the result of Austrian success because the Austrians had not treated the Ottoman reaya well in the areas conquered by them. This migration movement had become a great problem for the Ottoman State.¹¹³ On the other hand, the success of the Austrians in attracting non-muslim subjects in Rumelia

111 MD 99, p. 89, 145, 158, 178.

112 MD 99, p. 158, 164, 178.

113 MD 99, p. 13, 19, 20, 74, 84, 119, 130, 163, 178.

to their side through propaganda was another crucial problem for the Ottoman State.

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was reluctant to initiate the campaign before the preparations had been completed, for the defeat of the Ottomans would be inevitable against Austria and Venice. Such defeat had been experienced after the Vienna Siege. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha sent the Crimean army towards Skopje in order to prevent further problems and also to divert the Austrian army to gain time. He charged Mahmud Pasha who was in Morea with restoring order. In fact, the actions of the Crimean army and the appointment of Mahmud Pasha were the best decisions taken during the campaign since the Crimean army and the Morea forces cleared the enemy from the vicinity of Skopje. Subsequently, the Crimean army and Morea forces recaptured Kumanova and Kačanik forts from Austria and the kazas of Prizrin and Priştine, Novebarda Fortress and the vicinity of Kosova. In this way the activities of the Austrian army to the east of Niş were terminated.¹¹⁴

In early July 1690, preparations were completed. Finally, there was a meeting in the palace of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, attended by Selim Giray Han, Han of the Crimea and all of the commanders. At the end of the meeting, it was decided that the sultan would stay in İstanbul and Fazıl Mustafa Pasha would become the commander of the army. Hazinedar Ali Pasha was appointed as kaimmakam in İstanbul.¹¹⁵ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha moved with his army from Edirne on 13 July 1690.¹¹⁶ The Ottoman army stayed one day in each of the menzils of Cisir-i Mustafa Pasha, Harmanlı, Uludere, Kısali and Papaslı, and reached Filibe on 19 July 1690. The army stayed there until 23 July. On 22 July, the artilleries and ammunition in Filibe was transported towards Sofia. The Ottomans arrived at the menzil of Tatar Pazarı on 24 July. Here the army stayed for two days. On 25 July, Salih Pasha, mutasarrıf of the sandjak of

¹¹⁴ Defterdar, *Zübde.*, p. 349-356; Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 490-499; Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 166-168.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 169.

¹¹⁶ The dates of departure and arrival of the army differ in *Zübde-i Vekaiyat*, *Silahdar* and *Tarih-i Sülale-i Köprülüzade*. reliable informations about the position of the army during the campaign could be provided from defter MAD 7157. This defter is an Ordu Mühimesi for the campaign and gives the chronology of the campaign. This defter also gives information about the menzils used by the Ottomans after the departure from Edirne, about courses of departure as well as events which occurred during the campaign.

Silifke, joined the army with his soldiers. The army reached the menzil of İhtiman via the menzil of Buşla(?) on 28 July; after staying one day, they reached the menzil of Ormanlı on 30 July. On 31 July, the garrison and people of Sofia welcomed the army with great enthusiasm. The army entered Sofia on 1 August. The army met there in Sofia the soldiers of Anatolia, İznikmid, and the forces of Damascus joined them. The army was reinforced therein, and they moved on after leaving the army treasury in Sofia. They reached the menzil of Halkalı Bazar on 5 August. The army conveyed the greater part of the ammunition to the menzil of Dırağman before they left that menzil. Bolu Beylerbegi joined the army with his soldiers at Halkalı. They arrived at the menzil of Dırağman on 7 August where the Beglerbegi of Sivas joined the army. They also arrived in the menzil of Buğ(?) on 8 August. The beglerbegi of Canik came from Köstendil to join the army.¹¹⁷

The Ottoman army arrived in the vicinity of Şehirköy fortress which had been captured by the enemy. Fazıl Pasha demanded its surrender. However, Hungarian and Austrian forces in the fortress refused. The fortress was immediately besieged and the enemy forces surrendered the fortress to the Ottomans on 11 August. Moreover, on 12 August, when Ottoman forces arrived at Musa Pasha fort which was held by the enemy, the enemy soldiers evacuated the fort. The Ottoman army reached the menzil of İlice, near the fortress of Niş on 13 August and moved towards Niş after resting one day and completing their preparations.

The Ottoman army arrived near Niş fortress on 16 August. In the fortress, there were Austrian and Hungarian forces as well as 400 bandits who had persecuted muslims in the vicinity. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha demanded the surrender of the enemy soldiers. But his demand was rejected. The fortress was besieged from three sides. All units of the army joined in the siege and trenches and tunnels were excavated. The siege lasted 22 days, and when the enemy soldiers grasped that they would not be able to receive any aid, the fortress was surrendered to the Ottomans on 8 September. The enemy soldiers had been permitted to abandon the fortress on condition that they would leave their weapons behind. 6.000 Hungarian and Austrian soldiers left the fortress on 9 September. In this way the Ottomans seized an important fortress with 150

117 MAD 7157, p. 22, 24.

muslim captives as well as a great deal of ammunition. The Ottomans had obtained 30 pieces of artillery, rifles and other ammunition from the Austrians. Nearly 400 bandits in the fortress had not been permitted to leave but were executed when the fortress was surrendered. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha granted baksheesh from his own treasury to the soldiers who had participated in the siege.¹¹⁸ During the Ottoman siege of Niş, Austria had sent an army of 15.000 soldiers under the commander of Veterani to relieve the fortress. This army had reached the menzil of Yagodine near Niş.¹¹⁹

Before besieging large fortresses, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha demanded the besieging and conquest of small fortresses retained by the enemy. Therefore, before the commencement of the Niş Siege, Karaman Beylerbegi Dursun Mehmed Pasha and Tuna Captain Mezomorta Hüseyin Pasha were charged with preventing the dangers that could come from the Danube and with reconquering the fortress of Vidin which had great strategic importance for the conquest of Belgrade. The Vidin Fortress was besieged from both land and river and consequently conquered. The Ottomans now had possession of an important base for their departure to Belgrade. The village of Çiprofça in the Sandjak of Vidin, the stronghold of rebels and of bandits in the vicinity, was captured, and the bandits were massacred.¹²⁰

The Ottoman army resided for one more week in the menzil of Niş after the conquest of the fortress. During this time, preparations continued for the fortification of the fortress and the siege of Belgrade. Bridges that could have been used by the Ottomans had been wrecked by the retreating Austrians. Halep Beylerbegi Halil Pasha was charged with the establishment of a bridge on the Morava river. The Ottoman army moved from Niş and reached the menzil of Aleksinac on 12 September. The Tatar Han joined the army with 3.000 soldiers at the menzil of Rajene on 17 September. The army reached the menzil of Smederovo on 25 September via the menzils of Perakin, Morava, Yağvedise, Yalmıca(?) and Hasan Pasha.¹²¹ Smederovo was a small but important fortress on the way to Belgrade. The fortress was besieged on the same day. The

118 Ibid, 24, 27. Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 168-170; Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 370-371.

119 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 368.

120 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 369.

121 MAD 7157, p. 28, 29.

beglerbegi of Diyarbekir Kemankeş Ahmed Pasha was charged with the conquest of the palanga of Gügercinlik, near Smederovo which was held by the enemy. three hundred soldiers were sent from Belgrade to aid Smederovo but they could not enter the fortress and the fortress was captured on 27 September. Henceforth, the road to Belgrade was wholly secured.¹²² The Ottomans had embarked upon the preparations for the siege of Belgrade when Smederovo was captured. A general census of soldiers and ammunition was also conducted within the army.

Once the preparations were completed, the army arrived in the vicinity of Belgrade via the menzil of Çeşme on 1 October 1690. The siege of the fortress began in earnest from three sides on 2 October. Soldiers from Sivas, Anatolia and Egypt besieged from the Danube (east) side, the soldiers from Halep, Arnavud and Rumelia from the Sava (west) and the janissaries from Atpazarı (South). The defense of the fortress was formidable. On the seventh day of the siege (8 October 1690) when it seemed that the Ottoman attacks were ineffectual, a mortar fired by the Halep forces caused the explosion of the arsenal in the fortress. The explosion and ensuing fire caused the disintegration of the enemy army. A huge part of the fortress wall had been demolished, and the Ottoman army entered the fortress at this point. Approximately 15.000¹²³ enemy soldiers attempted to flee by boat and barge on the Danube and Sava rivers Many of them were drowned. In this way, the Ottomans had seized an important enemy base. The Ottomans had almost 1.500 casualties during the siege, the beglerbegis of Rumelia and Anatolia included. Baksheesh was dispersed to soldiers during the siege. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha granted 70 purses (*kese*) akça as baksheesh to the janissaries from his own treasury.¹²⁴

A messenger had been sent to the sultan who was in Edirne after the conquest of Niş to announce the conquest. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha received the Hatt-ı Hümayun and gifts sent by the sultan in recognition of the conquest of Niş when the army conquered Belgrade. The grand vizier restored order in

122 MAD 7157, p. 29.

123 This figure is between 25.000 and 35.000 in *Tarih-i Sülale-i Köprülüade*, and it seems exaggerated. A number between 10.000 and 15.000 is given in *Zübde-i Vekaiyat* and seems more logical.

124 MAD 7157, p. 30, 31; Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 171-172.

Belgrade, punished the bandits in the vicinity and made appointments for the protection of the city.

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had ordered Hüseyin Pasha, the governor of Bosnia, to conquer the enemy-held fortress of Eszek when he was in Smederovo. Hüseyin Pasha had besieged the fortress after capturing the forts in the vicinity of Eszek. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha moved towards Eszek on 15 October. He ordered to suspended the siege after arriving Eszek due to the impending winter weather. The fortress of Eszek would be besieged in the spring by the Bosnian governor Hüseyin Pasha.¹²⁵

Ottoman forces in Morea had also joined the Austrian campaign under the commander of the Beglerbegi of the Morea, Koca Halil Pasha. The Venetian army had both attacked from the sea and the land and captured the fortresses of Avlona and Kanina. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, when he received this information, charged the beylerbegi of Morea Koca Halil Pasha, the beylerbegi of Rumelia Cafer Pasha, the beylerbegi of İskenderiye Süleyman Pasha, and the sandjak-begi of Prizren and Dukakin Mahmud Pasha to recapture these fortresses and to clear the enemy from the region. It was decided that the necessary ammunition would be provided from the fortress of Belgrade and from the fortresses that were near the fortresses of Avlona and Kanina. The Ottoman army immediately moved to that region and after vehement struggles recaptured these fortresses and cleared the vicinity of the enemy.¹²⁶

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha ordered the conquest of Shanis Island on the Danube river when he came back from Eszek. Although Shanis island was small, it was fortified by Austria and there was also artillery there. This situation required the conquest of the islet due to the fact that it rendered difficult the movement of the Danube fleet and it was also an obstacle for future aid. The non-muslims of the islet surrendered to Ottoman forces after a short siege. They were permitted to leave on condition that they would work for the overhaul of the fortress of Belgrade.

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha sent the Crimean Han with his soldiers to İstanbul, made final appointments for the protection of the region and resolved the

125 Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 173.

126 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 379-380.

provisioning problems of the city and moved towards İstanbul on 5 November. The army arrived at the Sahra of Davud Pasha where the Anatolian soldiers encounter at this military station near İstanbul via the menzils of Hisarcık, Semendire, Gabrova, Vidin, Kırkkilise and Edirne.¹²⁷ Sultan Süleyman II had come to this military station to welcome the army despite his illness. Grand Vizier Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was invited to the pavilion, *otagh*, of the Sultan; and he received gifts.¹²⁸ The Sipahi soldiers coming from Anatolia and other eyalets had been permitted in the Sahra of Davud Pasha to go to their home districts before the army entered İstanbul. The grand vizier moved towards İstanbul with the sultan and janissaries when these soldiers had moved to their home districts.

The Second Austrian Campaign and Slankamen Battle

The campaign of the Ottoman army under the leadership of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha proved to be successful in Rumelia against the armies of Austria, Hungary and Venice. The imminent winter after the fall of Belgrade had prevented the capture of Eszek and its vicinity and also the pursuit of the enemy army. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had appointed Özi Beylerbegi Çerkez Ahmed Pasha to protect Erdel against the Austrian army while coming back from Eszek. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha also sent Silahor Süleyman Pasha with a number of janissaries and Tatar soldiers to Erdel while he was coming back to İstanbul after the conquest of Belgrade. Süleyman Pasha was to capture Erdel and would re-enthroned Emre Thokoly as the king of Erdel. He was also to provide soldiers and provisions to the fortresses of Temeşvar, Göle, Yanova and Varad which were defended by Ottoman forces. After capturing the fortress of Lipve with the forces of Beylerbegi Cafer Pasha, Süleyman Pasha entered Erdel. However, almost the whole of Erdel was in the hands of Austrian and Hungarian forces. But later on Emre Thokoly was completely defeated by Austrian forces. Winter was also thwarting the movement of the Ottoman forces. If the Ottoman state

127 Silâhdar, *Silâhdar Tarihi*, p. 547.

128 Ibid, p. 547-548, "Hoş geldin yol zahmetleri, berhudar ol, yüzün ak, kılıcın berrak, ekmeğim sana helal olsun. Dilhah-ı hümayunum üzere hizmet eyledin, seleflerinden böyle bir ulu gaza müyesser olmadı. Hakk-ı cell ü 'alâ hazretleri takdirine muvaffak etmek ancak zaman-ı saadetimizde sana nasib oldu".

did not carry out a campaign against Austria in the spring, the region of Erdel would be lost and the successes of the first campaign would be in vain.¹²⁹

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha gave particular attention to financial affairs and the rebellions in Egypt and Cyprus when he came back to İstanbul. He also dealt with preparations for the campaign against the Austrians who were in control in Erdel. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha did not himself want to participate in the spring campaign. He was eager that another officer be appointed as army commander. His purpose was to continue the work he had started after returning to İstanbul and to become more closely involved in the problems of the state. If he had joined the campaign, his work would not have been completed.

Another matter which concerned him was that Sultan Süleyman II was ill and could suddenly die from his illness. A qualified prince had to be enthroned after death of Sultan. The candidates for the throne were Mustafa II who was the son of Mehmed IV and Ahmed, the brother of Süleyman II. Mustafa II was supported by those people opposed to Fazıl Mustafa Pasha. The grand vizier supported Ahmed II. The issue of the campaign was discussed in diwan and Fazıl Mustafa Pasha expressed his wish not to participate in person. The diwan members indicated that it would be more beneficial if Fazıl Mustafa Pasha joined the expedition as the commander of the army. At the end of the meeting it was decided that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha would command to the army, and the sultan and princes would be sent to Edirne.¹³⁰

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha completed his final preparations and moved towards Edirne via the Sahra of Davud Pasha on 2 May 1691 when he appointing his relative Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha as the kaim-makam of İstanbul. Soldiers from Anatolia and other eyalets would join the army in Edirne and in Rumelia. The army arrived in Edirne on 11 May via the menzils of Ordu, Küçük Çekmece, Büyük Çekmece, Silivri, Çorlu and Bergos.¹³¹ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha stayed in Edirne for four days. Before leaving, he warned his officers that Ahmed II would be enthroned if Süleyman II died. The army reached Belgrade on 22 June via the same menzils as in the previous year. On 26 June when the army was at the menzil of Akıncı, they were informed that Sultan Süleyman II

129 Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 175-177.

130 Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 177.

131 MAD 7157, p. 32.

had died on 23 June and that Ahmed II was enthroned the same day. The grand vizier received a Hatt-ı Hümayun, seal, and hilat sent by the new Sultan Ahmed II on 1 July, before arriving at the Sava.¹³²

Battle of Slankamen and Death of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha

The Austrian army was between Varadin and Zemlin when the army reached Belgrade. The Ottomans heard that part of the enemy force was proceeding towards the Sahra of Zemun which was near Belgrade.

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha planned to attack the Austrians from the river Sava before the arrival of the enemy army at Belgrade. However, some commanders refused to comply it. Since part of the Anatolian army and especially the Crimean troops had not yet arrived. They indicated that it would be dangerous to move towards the enemy army before the arrival of the Crimean Army.¹³³ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha did not accept this hypothesis and ordered the establishment of a bridge on the river Sava for the future use of his army. Moreover, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha undertook new precautions to stave off the dangers that could come from the Danube and to preclude future support for the enemy. The Danubean fleet reached Belgrade on 27 July. On 6 August The whole Ottoman army moved towards the Zemun sahra where the enemy army was, via the river Sava. They saw that the enemy army had withdrawn when they arrived at Zemun on 7 August 1691. This withdrawal encouraged Fazıl Mustafa Pasha and he moved towards Karlowitz, in order to hinder the Austrian army which withdrew towards Varadin. The Ottoman army arrived at the menzil of Slankamen before the Austrian forces. The intention of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was to gain time until the arrival of the Crimean army.

The commander of the Austrian army suddenly attacked when he was informed that the road to Varadin was occupied by the Ottomans. On 20 August Ottoman forces, resisted the first attack. Commander Ludwig attacked for a second time. During this attack, Austrian weaponry caused the withdrawal and the flight of Türkmen and Ekrad forces on the right wing. Simultaneously, kapıkulu cavalry on the same wing began to withdraw when they realized that

132 MAD 7157, p.33, 34.

133 *Silâhdar, Silâhdar Tarihi*, p. 588-590.

they could expect no relief. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha attacked the enemy center when he saw that the enemy proceeded towards his center via the right wing. This encouraged his army, and they initiated a general attack. When the enemy army began to withdraw, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was wounded in his forehead. Soldiers who were near him announced the fall of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha to the ground by crying out, "The commander has fallen". This caused a panic and the Ottoman army began to withdraw, to the advantage of the Austrian forces. Although the Austrian forces were exhausted, they managed to capture the Ottoman camp (ordugah). They seized the treasury and heavy weaponry. Halep Beglerbegi Halil Pasha took over command of the army, which began to withdraw towards Belgrade. He aimed to take the army to Belgrade to prevent its disintegration. At the same time, the Austrian captain on the Danube captured a great deal of enemy ammunition and provisions vessels. The field of battle was covered with scores of bodies: both sides had enormous casualties. However, the body of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha could not be found on the battle field.¹³⁴

REFORMS

Permission for the Rebuilding of Churches

At the beginning of the second chapter, it was stated that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had abolished the wine and arak tax imposed on non-muslim subjects when he became grand vizier. As stated above, his purpose was to regain the support of people who were inclined to collaborate with enemy. He attempted to achieve his aim not merely by abrogating the tax but also through other incentives. For instance, prisoners taken after the conquest of Niş and Belgrade were freed and allowed to return to their home districts. They also received provisions from the state granaries. The Austrian army, during its withdrawal from Belgrade by the Ottoman army, had taken approximately 10.000 non-muslim subjects from between Belgrade and Niş. They were settled on the islets of the Danube and across the river. When the Ottomans captured these regions, these people requested from the grand vizier to be resettled in their

¹³⁴ Ibid, p. 591-595; MAD 7157, p. 36-37; Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 178-179; Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 400-402.

former locations. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha gave permission for this and appointed a *çavuş* to provide security travelled as they towards their villages. State granaries also provided these people with wheat suitable for seeding, barley and also oxen.¹³⁵

Another incentive was the first general order permitting the restoration of churches on the Ottoman frontiers. The establishment and the overhaul of churches in the Ottoman state had depended upon the permission of the state. A church could not be built and repaired without permission. Churches that were not restored for a long time became neglected and inappropriate for worship. Churches in deserted places became ruined. Many churches had also been demolished due to neglect caused by the abandonment of villages as their inhabitants settled in secure places to escape the Celali Rebellions in Anatolia, or left their villages due to wars waged in Rumelia. Non-muslim subjects who returned to their former lands after the re-establishment of security in Anatolia and Rumelia requested permission from Fazıl Mustafa Pasha to rebuild then churches and this was granted. From many different regions of the empire came requests for permission to restore churches and this was granted. Church restoration was under the control of kadis. The establishment of a new church or the addition of a new building to a church was not permitted. There would be a punishment for those who violated this rule.¹³⁶

Cizye Reform:

The term *cizye* designates the poll-tax imposed on non-muslim male subjects who did not change their religion and continued to live in an Islamic country under the dhimma law. By the same token, the state guaranteed security of life, property and religious freedom to *zımmis*. *Cizye* was not taken from children, women, the disabled, the poor or priests.¹³⁷

In the Ottoman state, the term *harac* was used in place of *cizye* until the sixteenth century but later the use of *cizye* or *cizye-i şer'i* became widespread.

135 Silâhdar, *Silâhdar Tarihi*, p. 539.

136 MD 99, p. 103, 140, 143, 157. MD 100 p. 16, 19, 21, 24, 31, 34, 37, 54, 64, 78, 95, 145, 190; MD 101, p. 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 24, 29, 30, 31, 33, 37, 41, 45, 48, 50, 52, 53, 58, 72; MD 102, p. 22, 37, 39.

137 Mehmet Erkal, "Cizye", *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 8 vols., İstanbul, p. 42-47.

Cizye was taken by two methods according to Islamic law. One was called *maktu* and the second was *cizye ale'r-ruûs*. *Maktu cizye* was a fixed amount of money. This method of collection was widespread and referred either to the annual payment by Christian principedoms that were bound vassals of the Ottoman state, or else to a lump sum taken from zimmi subjects of the sultan by community. Thus, a decrease in the population of a community for any reason led to an increase in the shares of the remaining members and thus zimmi became less able to pay their cizye. With the passage of time administrative control became weak, and regular registration of cizye payers was neglected. According to *Vakiat-ı Ruzmerre* the amount of cizye per person was 30-40 akça in certain regions and 2000-3000 akça in other regions.¹³⁸ A documented example is the situation in Varna in 1685. By 1685, non-muslim subjects numbered 1295 households and were obliged to pay 355.050 akça as cizye. However, after the second Vienna defeat in 1683, most of the non-muslims left Varna. A new census was conducted in Varna in 1685. According to census results, the number of households was now only 876 and the amount of cizye to be paid was 285.970 akça. If there had not been a new census in Varna, non-muslim subjects would have still been obliged to pay 355.050 akça.¹³⁹

Tax-payers by the method of *cizye-i ale'r-ruûs* were divided into three groups, a'lâ "rich", evsat "middle" and edna "poor". The amount of cizye paid by them was respectively 48, 24 and 12 şer'î dirhem of silver, or 4, 2 and 1 gold dinar.¹⁴⁰ Cizye, taxes were one of the most important revenue resources of the Ottoman state, especially as expenditures increased after the second Vienna Siege and statesmen sought to overcome the financial crisis.¹⁴¹ I will discuss the cizye reform during the grand vizierate of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha by answering the questions below: What was the nature of the cizye reform of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha? Had any similar reforms been attempted before this reforms? Did Fazıl Mustafa Pasha play an active role? What prompted the cizye

138 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakiat-ı Ruzmerre*, 2 vols, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, Revan, no: 1224, p 119-120.

139 MAD 7395, p. 11.

140 Halil İnalçık, "Cizye", *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 8 vols, İstanbul, p. 45-48; MAD 5591, p. 6-7; MAD 102, p. 50-52.

141 Halil Sahillioğlu, "Bir Asırlık Osmanlı Para Tarihi 1640-1740", İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, İstanbul, 1965, p. 75.

reform of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha? What were the developments and consequences?

The cizye reform was based on the principle of Cizye-i ale'r-ruûs, namely, cizye tax would be collected according to the degree of wealth and income of the non-muslims. This was begun in İstanbul on 26.October 1688, and in November 1688 firmans explaining this reform were sent to other provinces.¹⁴² Therefore, the attempt at cizye reform began before the grand vizierate of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, who came to office in late 1689. We have no information as to whether Fazıl Mustafa Pasha played an active role in this first attempt. We know that this kind of cizye practice first had been used after the conquest of Crete in 1670 during the grand vizierate of Köprülü Ahmet Pasha.¹⁴³ Because of this Fazıl Mustafa Pasha knew this new practice and also just before becoming grand vizier was in Kandiya as muhafız. Most probably Fazıl Mustafa Pasha supported this reform because the census officers could have been sent to some chosen cities and a strict census was done in İstanbul while he was kaimmakam of İstanbul. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha activated this reform and strictly controlled it after becoming grand vizier.

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha endeavoured to disseminate this innovation across the whole empire in 1691, including merchants and non-muslims within its scope.

142 MD 98, p. 11-12: Brusa, İzmir, Manisa mollalarına Kuşadası kadısına ve zikr olunan kazaların Yahudi tâifesi tahririne me'mûr olan zide kadruhûya hüküm ki, bundan akdem hazinenin ... vefret ve kesreti zamanlarında memâlik-i mahrûsam dahi Yahudilerden harac-ı şer'î noksan üzere taleb ve hazîne-i âmire defterlerine kayd olunub, sinîn-i sâbıkada ... cizyeleri şey'-i kalîl olub ihmal olunduğundan her vechile müreffehü'l-hal idiler. Halen mütemekkin buldukları yerde kendüleri ve ... ve murahik (?) olub harac-ı şer'î taleb olunmak bi-hasebi'ş-şer'î ve'l-kânûn caiz olanların müceddeden kendülerinin ve babalarının isimleri ile ale'l-esâmi 'âlâ ve evsat ve edna itibari ile harac-ı şer'î taleb olunmak üzere defter olunub ve defter mucebince her birinden râyicü'l- vakt olan dirhem-i şer'î hesâbı üzere 'âlâsından 816 akça, evsatından 408 akça ve ednasından 204 akça harac-ı şer'îleri irsâl olunan mübâşir ma'rifetiyle tahsil itdirilüb biz maktu' kaydolmuş idik veyahud hâneye bağlu idik deyü illet ve bahâne itdirilmeyüb tahrir olundukları üzere tahsil ve ordu-yı hümâyûnuma irsal eyleyesiz deyü yazılmıştır. Fî evasıt-ı M. Sene 1100. Birer sureti dahi Haleb, Şam, Kudüs, Trablusşam, Sayda, Beyrut, Lefkoşe, Kıbrıs, Sakız, Rodos cezirelerine, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Karahisar-ı şarkî, Trabzon, Sürmene, Musul, Ankara, Karahisar-ı sahib, Amasya, Divriği, Eğin, Arapkir, Kırkkilise, Yanbolu, Karınabad, Vidin Sancaklarına ve Bağdad, Basra ve Mısır valilerine gönderilmiştir.

143 Ersin Gülsoy, "Girit'in Fethi ve Adada Osmanlı İdaresinin Tesisi 1645-1670", Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul 1997, p. 271-272; See also BOA, TD 980, p.2-3.

4 şerifi gold were to be collected from *a'lâ*, 2 from *evsat*, 1 from *edna* or 48 dirhems silver from *a'lâ*, 24 from *evsat* and 12 from *edna*; as esedi kuruş, 9 from *a'lâ*, 4.5 from *evsat* and 2.25 from *edna*. As akça 816 from *a'lâ*, 408 from *evsat* and 204 from *edna*.¹⁴⁴ The second part of the cizye reform was the transfer of cizye revenues to the cizye muhasebesi kalemi, except those of Egypt, Bagdad, Basra, Eflak, Bogdan and Dubrovnik. They were to be considered as treasury revenues. It was decided that the incomes of various mukataas, sultanik wakfs, hass estates of viziers and sandjaks, and cizye assigned as odjaklik, were to be collected as one unit by the Cizye Muhasebesi Kalemi.¹⁴⁵ After this, cizye would not be collected by the groups mentioned above but by the treasury on its own account. Cizye would be collected by cizyedars, appointed by the treasury. Moreover, the cizyedars would receive from *a'lâ* 10 para, from *evsat* 8 para, from *edna* 4 para.¹⁴⁶

The new method of cizye collection was introduced by categorizing cizye payers as *a'lâ*, *evsat* and *edna*. Separate receipts for each group bore the seals of Cizye Muhasebecisi and Defterdar. Cizye collectors received 20-30 thousand of these receipts. The cizye papers of *a'lâ*, *evsat* and *edna* were in different colors. After the tax collection the cizye collector also had to stamp his seal on the cizye paper retained by the tax payer. Thus, there were three different seals on a single cizye paper. The purpose of these seals and papers was to prevent problems and abuses. When non-muslims were asked whether they had paid their cizye or not, they had to show these papers. The collectors had to account for the number of papers given to them. The collectors were responsible for the quantity of tax collected as well as the number of papers given them.¹⁴⁷

The collection of cizye, as stated above, first began in İstanbul. Sarı Osman Agha, the former customs intendant, *Gümrük Emini*, was appointed to the post of collecting cizye of İstanbul on 12.3.1691.¹⁴⁸ Sarı Osman Agha delivered the first cizye moneys collected from non-muslims in İstanbul to the

144 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakıat*, p 257-258.

145 MD 98, p. 11-12.

146 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 387; Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 559; Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 176-177; MAD 1276, p. 1-50; MAD 3456, p. 372-373; MAD 7410, p. 16-17; KK 3077, p. 4; KK 3508, p. 1-5.

147 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakıât*, p. 257-258, 298-299.

148 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakıat*, p 119-120.

treasury on 13.5.1692. The task of collection lasted approximately 15 months. Sarı Osman Agha distributed 8.235 cizye papers to jews in Galata, Hasköy and Üsküdar, of whom 545 were *a'lâ*, 3.469 were *evsat* and 4.221 were *edna*.¹⁴⁹ The total number of cizye papers distributed by Sarı Osman Pasha in Galata was 12.821. This number comprised 1.015 *a'lâ*, 7.584 *evsat* and 4.222 *edna*. The number of cizye paper distributed in central İstanbul was 23.873. Consisting of 2.501 *a'lâ*, 15.651 *evsat* and 5.721 *edna*. The number of cizye paper distributed for *Yave cizye* in Galata and in a total of central İstanbul center was 20.292. He had distributed a total of 54.404 cizye papers.¹⁵⁰ Sarı Osman Agha collected 12.500 kuruş as total of the cizye of İstanbul.¹⁵¹

Cizye was collected in other cities of the Ottoman Empire as it was in İstanbul, namely the same procedures were followed. Problems emerged due to the different money types used in cizye collection and in submission to the treasury. Non-muslims wanted to pay their cizyes with the type of money that they held at that moment. This situation led to confusion in calculation and to abuses as well. Therefore a firman issued in August 1692 declared that *yaldız gold*, Hungarian gold and *esedi kuruş* would not be given as cizye tax, but only *şerifi gold* and *sim-i hâlis* would be accepted.¹⁵²

It would be pertinent to consider the cizye revenues since the beginning of the reform, in order to understand whether the cizye reform introduced during the grand vizierate of Fâzıl Mustafa Pasha was successful in augmenting treasury revenue.

Below, Table I is total annual cizye revenues and their ratios of budget income.¹⁵³

149 MAD 1276, p. 1.

150 MAD 4022, p. 1; MAD 4007, p. 1.

151 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakiât*, p. 314.

152 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakiât*, p 257-258.

153 Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi*, İstanbul, 1985, p.146.

Table I

Years	Cizye (akça)	Budget ratio as %
1103/1691-92	223.258.191	23.7
1104/1692-93	409.569.392	35
1110/1698-99	533.270.820	42.5
1113/1701-2	537.535.400	45.5
1114/1702-3	546.452.360	48.2

Below, Table II is annual cizye revenues taken from Christian and Jews in Anatolia and Rumelia.¹⁵⁴

Table II

Years	Cizye (akça)
1101/1689-90	156.521.584
1102/1690-91	311.945.500
1103/1691-92	275.211.000
1104/1692-93	342.530.370
1105/1693-94	348.751.980
1106/1694-95	359.511.952
1107/1695-96	370.100.380

It is obvious that cizye revenues considerably increased after the reform. These increases continued in subsequent years and they became an important source of revenue for the state treasury. Therefore one may reasonably argue that the reform of cizye exercised during the grand vizierate period of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was successful. With this reform, cizye became a continuous and important source of revenue for the empire.

Monetary Policy:

Here, we shall try to provide information on monetary policy during the grand vizierate of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha by asking what conditions affected the

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 147.

monetary policy pursued during that period. If these conditions prevailed before his period, what were the policies pursued by previous grand viziers? Did Fazıl Mustafa Pasha play an active role in formulating these policies? What were the results of the policies he actually pursued? Was the monetary policy a sequel to previous policies? What were the consequences of this policy? How did it affect reaya and the state? Finally, was this policy successful or not?

The events that affected the monetary policy pursued during the grand vizierate of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had begun earlier. The wars after the second Vienna defeat in 1683 caused an increase in military expenditures and a decrease in state revenues. The Austrians had captured Hungary, Serbia and the Danube area and the Venetians had seized Dalmatia, losses of land which caused a great decline in the tax revenue of the Ottoman state. The prolonged war had also hindered the payment of wages so that unpaid janissaries rebelled and dethroned Mehmed IV. Süleyman II, the successor of Mehmed IV, sent silver and gold objects to the Imperial Mint from the Palace and Has Ahur in order to pay the soldiers' salaries. However, these attempts were insufficient. So a new tax *imdad-ı seferiye* was first imposed on İstanbul and later on the whole country; secondly, cizye income was transferred to the treasury, and finally the *bedel-i timar* was again levied. A new akça adjustment was made in May 1688 when the last property from the palace was minted. seventeen units of akça were minted from one dirhem of silver instead of five. Furthermore, the state minted *mankur* (mangır) from copper on 13 October 1688. This was an attempt to control inflation. eight hundred mankur could be minted from 1 okka copper. two mankur was equivalent to one akça. The reaya initially had no reaction to the mankur which was used even in trade in the market.¹⁵⁵

We do not have definite information as to whether Fazıl Mustafa Pasha played an active role in these reforms. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was the muhafiz of Kandiye when mankurs were first minted in İstanbul. Therefore one may argue that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha did not play an active role in the minting of mankurs. However, one may claim that Fazıl Mustafa Pasha supported the mankur policy since he amplified this policy manner during his grand vizierate. The mankur was withdrawn from circulation after the death of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha.

155 Halil Sahillioğlu, *Bir Asırlık Osmanlı Para Tarihi 1640-1740*, p. 75-85.

As stated above, the monetary policy pursued during the grand vizierate of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was the sequel to previous policies. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha exercised this policy extensively even though it was disadvantageous for the people. A new monetary adjustment was made in 1690. One mankur became equivalent to one akça. Thus one kuruş was equivalent to 120 mankur, *Şerifi* gold to 270 mankur and *Yaldız* gold to 300 mankur.¹⁵⁶

The great appreciation of the mankur compared to its former value caused increased inflation. As a matter of fact, the real cause of inflation was not only the new adjustment in the mankur value, but also in the same period spurious mankurs were widespread in the market. During the grand vizierate of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, spurious mankurs were minted in Rumelia especially in 1690. The reaya and traders preferred the spurious mankurs. For example, in Tarlan, a village of Yenişehir kazası in Tırhala Sandjagi, and in Beşkapılı, a village of Görüce kazası in Pasha Sandjagi, 8-9 hundred spurious mankurs were traded in the market for 1 gold piece and 3-4 hundred for 1 kuruş. The reaya changed its gold and silver to mankur in the above mentioned places. While the state offered 120 mankur for 1 kuruş, the counterfeiters provided 3-4 hundred mankurs for 1 kuruş. Similarly, traders that came from Rumelia and brought tobacco from Yenice-i Karasu and Yenice-i Vardar, had begun to bring mankur instead of tobacco.

Faced with this situation the state sought solutions in order to prevent the minting of spurious mankurs. Firstly, the production of mankur in Bosnia was prohibited in 4 January 1691.¹⁵⁷ The purpose was to provide the mankurs from merely one source, that is from the İstanbul Mint and to prevent the spurious mankurs coming from Rumelia in this way. The relevant firman indicated that spurious mankurs should not be accepted. The reaya lost confidence in the state over its mankur policy when the Bosnia Mint was closed. For instance, the reaya began not to accept mankur minted one year before in İstanbul Mint, but they accepted the mankur minted a few months earlier. The other measure taken by the state to control spurious mankurs, was the aggressive pursuit of spurious mankurs. In this way, thousands of spurious mankurs were seized, and melted down in the İstanbul Mint. The state bought the that melted copper by paying 1

156 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakıat*, p 138-139, 158-159.

157 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakıat*, p. 109-110.

kuruş for one *kıyye*. Thus, the state both prevented the spurious mankurs coming to İstanbul and provided a certain quantity of copper for the Mint.¹⁵⁸

What kind of problems had the mankur policy of the state and the abundance of spurious mankurs created? This situation led to a shortage of food and also to the formation of a black market, namely, the increase of the prices since the traders and their customers were willing to use mankurs when they bought goods. However, producers preferred to sell their goods in exchange for silver and gold. Therefore, there was a shortage of food in İstanbul and prices increased these as well. For example, a *kıyye* of meat, which was one of the most important essentials, rose to 32 akça, a kile of rice from 120 akça to 200 akça, wheat from 80-90 akça to 180 akça and barley from 40 akça to 60 akça.¹⁵⁹ In order to prevent price increases and the shortage of food, the government summoned the *kethüdas* and *yigitbashis* from all walks of life. In the meeting, it was unanimously decided to prohibit the use of old mankurs in trade, and then substitute by new mankurs minted in İstanbul. It was also declared that those who disobeyed would be punished. Assets and liabilities would be transacted 2/3 in gold and silver and 1/3 as mankur and those who did not comply with that rule would be punished.¹⁶⁰ It is obvious that the application of new rules regarding the mankur were not only pernicious for the reaya, but also caused temporary loses to the state treasury. Officers and *mültezims* in Rumelia, Anatolia and in other eyalets who had exchanged the taxes collected in gold for mankur as a result of collaboration with Jewish sarrafs gave mankur to the treasury instead of gold. This deprived the treasury of gold and silver which the state needed in order to buy certain supplies for the campaign. This shortage of gold and silver put the state in a difficult position. It was declared that taxes collected as gold and silver would be given directly to the treasury as gold and silver and mankur would not be accepted.¹⁶¹

It is stated above that there was a loss of confidence in the mankur in the great cities, especially in İstanbul, where there were a shortage of food and price increases as a result of the monetary adjustment of 1690. For instance,

158 Ibid, p. 109-111.

159 Ibid, p. 115-116.

160 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakıat*, p 158-159.

161 MD 99, p. 1.

producers accepted one gold piece as equivalent to 500 mankur and one esedi kuruş as equivalent to 200 mankur which was approximately equivalent to half of the value stipulated by the state for the mankur. The state set one kuruş as equivalent to 120 mankur, and one gold piece as 270-300 mankur.¹⁶² Therefore, artisans became unable to buy goods or sell them. Goods were sold at high prices in the black market.

The increase of military expenditures after the second Vienna siege required a new monetary adjustment. Hence, in firmans issued on 28.6.1691, one şerifi and Hungarian gold piece appreciated from 270 mankur to 360 mankur, Yıldız gold from 300 mankur to 400 mankur, one kuruş from 120 mankur to 160 mankur and one *para* from three mankur to four mankur. Besides, it was decided that the state would calculate these money values at the old rate of exchange for its revenues, namely it would receive one kuruş as 120 mankur, Şerifi gold as 270 mankur and Yıldız gold as 300 mankur, but would apply the new rates to its expenditures.¹⁶³ The state accrued 25 % profit from this difference in exchange rates.

The monetary policy exercised during the grand vizierate period of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha attempted to put state finances in a better situation, so that soldiers could receive their wages, and endeavored to cover state expenditures through the minting of mankur. Thus, the Ottoman governors prevented income from being used for military expenditures, and rebellion was avoided. The state treasury, traders, and black marketers benefited from the reforms. However, the reaya and the artisans found themselves in a very difficult position due to price increases. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha emphasized the issue of religion in exercising his monetary policy in order to win the support of the reaya, and he was supported by the ulema in the continuation of his policy.¹⁶⁴ This monetary policy based on inflation, which was practiced on a large scale during the grand vizierate of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, was a momentous experience for the state. The mankur was withdrawn from circulation immediately after the death of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha on 16.11.1691. Henceforth, the state returned to gold and silver money.

162 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakıat*, p 138-139.

163 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakıat*, p 138-139.

164 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakıat*, p 158-159.

Transaction of Narh:

Narh, the setting of a maximum price for basic necessities, and the regular inspection of prices and weights and measures in the bazaar were among the most important responsibilities of the head of the community, whether sultan or local kadi. Ottoman sultans took this duty most seriously since the prevention of a shortage of basic goods and an economy of plenty was a central concern of the sultan.¹⁶⁵ As the absolute proxy of the sultan the grand vizier employed people who were directly responsible for the execution of Narh.¹⁶⁶ As mentioned above Fazıl Mustafa Pasha did not consider narh an important issue during his grand vizierate. He did not interfere in prices. This neglect led to an increase in prices and caused reaya to the suffer. This situation was occasionally reported to Fazıl Mustafa Pasha and he was asked to take precautions.¹⁶⁷ Why did Fazıl Mustafa Pasha not control the narh despite the price increases and the difficult position of the reaya? What was his attitude regarding narh? Was it based on religious or economic considerations?

Fazıl Mustafa Pasha underwent a medrese education from his childhood and studied Islamic sciences and especially hadith. Therefore he had a sound knowledge of religion and great respect towards Islamic law and the ulema. All of his actions were based on Islamic law and he always emphasized the religious angle. One may claim that his attitude towards narh was based on Islamic law, as well, since Muhammed, prophet of the muslims, refused the implementation of narh despite the great desire of the people. This attitude of the prophet on the issue of narh, continued during the time of his successors.

Mukataa and Tax Farm System

A mukataa means a source of revenue estimated and entered into the registers of the finance department, each as a separate unit.¹⁶⁸ The Ottoman empire could convert any kind of agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises into a tax-farm, *mukataa*. Although the incomes of tax-farms

165 Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600.", p. 46.

166 M. Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, p. 655.

167 Behçetî, *Tarih*, p. 176; M. Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, p. 654-655.

168 Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600.", p. 57-58.

belonged to the Ottoman state, they could be appropriated by wakfs,¹⁶⁹ given as salaries, named *ulufe* or *ocaklık*¹⁷⁰ or they could be allocated as *zeamet*; and *hass*; to Ottoman statesman and viziers¹⁷¹.

From the introduction of the *mukataa*; system, the management of tax farms by *iltizam*; or *emanet*; was the standard application. *İltizam*; referred to the acquired right of tax collection by an entrepreneur (tax farmer) in return for an amount of money which was fixed at auction. *Mukataas* were in general auctioned for one to three year periods. *Emanet*, the other method to collect taxes involved the appointment of a salaried government commissioner, an *emin*, to do job of a tax-farmer. The agrarian taxes to be collected from the land reserved for the sultan, *Havass-ı Hümayun*, or more exactly for the central treasury, were generally sold as tax-farms to private persons, the viziers and governors for their *hass*; benefices, and even big *timar* holders resorted to the same method, or sometimes they employed stewards.¹⁷²

Given this background, my aim is to explain the changes in *mukataa* system during the period of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha by asking several questions. After the second Vienna defeat and the relative worsening of Ottoman situation, what kind of problems did the Ottomans face? Did these problems continue during the period of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha? Or did new problems arise? And if so, how did Fazıl Mustafa Pasha try to solve these?. And finally, was there any relation between the transactions of the tax-farms in the period of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha and the *Malikane* system which was declared in 1695 shortly after the death of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha?

The second Vienna defeat and continuing wars caused serious financial problems and sharp decreases in the *mukataa*; incomes, obviously one of the major cash sources of the state. One of the main reasons was the loss in the Ottoman territories on the borders, sometimes permanently and sometimes temporarily, due to the military defeats, and consequently the loss of *mukataas*.

169 For instance the *mukataa* of Yeniil belonged to the vakf of Üsküdar Valide Sultan Camii.

170 KK 3076, there are many *mukataas* like this.

171 The *mukataa* of Karahisar-ı Sahib ihtisab ihzariye was given The governor of Anatolia as *havass* MAD 139, p. 28.

172 Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600.", p. 65-66.

Another reasons were the delay in payments and excessive amounts of collected taxes from the subjects by the *mültezims*. This situation gave rise to both to a decrease in state incomes and to the abandonment of lands by the Ottoman subjects.¹⁷³ In other areas of the Ottoman Empire, a similar situation was experienced. For instance in southern Anatolia, in the province of Rakka, between the years 1680-1695, of the two hundred villages given as mukataas approximately 10-15 % survived. The others were deserted and ruined due to brigandage and extra taxes.¹⁷⁴ Another serious problem was a kind of double selling which means the selling of the right of tax collection by the state before the end of the contract with the initial tax farmer, *mültezim*, which certainly caused a lack of trust on the side of the candidate tax farmers.¹⁷⁵

These problems continued when Fazıl Mustafa Pasha became Grand vizier. His first action was to try to resettle the subjects on deserted lands.¹⁷⁶ Consequently the subjects would be able to cultivate their lands and pay their taxes. Although his settlement policies were successful, the implementation transaction of the mankur system in the same period had caused unfortunately a new problem. As cited above the *mültezims* were insisting on the collection of taxes in gold, silver or para and paying the state in mankur. Furthermore the subjects in their turn wanted to render their payments in mankur while collect in gold, silver or para. Such a situation was obviously creating many difficulties for each group. In order to solve this problem a decree was issued in 1691 by Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, under the reign of Süleyman II. According to this decree,

173 MD 100, p. 127; MAD 19862, p. 9, "Arz-ı bende-i bi-mikdar budur ki, Rumeli ve Anadolu'da vâki' bazı mîrî mukâtaaları nice kimesneler her sene kendülere almak için bundan akdem bir tarîk ile hatt-ı hümâyûn alub ocaklık makamında kendülere tapsîs eylemişlerve niceleri dahi 'ulûfe bedeli deyü alub bi-berat zabt ederler mâl-ı mukâtaat kapu kullarının mevâciblerine her üç ayda bir taksit iken vakt ü zamanında taksitlerin eda eylemeyüb müzâyaka-i haziheye bâ'is olduklarından gayrı verdikleri ademlere tahammülünden ziyâde fazla ile vermeleriyle zabt edenlerin ta'addi ve tecâvüzünden re'âyâ fukarâsı mukaddemâ 'arz-ı hâl eylediklerinde şikâyetlerine ruhsât ve müsâ'ade olunmadığından perâkende ve peîşan olmağa bâ'is olmağa bu makûle mukâtaat zabt edenlerden vakt ü zamanıyla taksit vermeyenlerin ta'addi ve tecâvüzlerinden re'âyâ fukarâsı şikâyet edenlerin üzerinden ref' ve peşin ve taksit ve keffili olanlara der uhde olunmak için fermân-'âli ihsân buyurulmak babında fermân devletlü ve sa'âdetlü sultanım hazretlerindir. Der zaman-ı Hüseyin Efendi. Fi Şehr-i Ca Sene 1099".

174 MAD 9856, p. 30.

175 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakiât-ı Ruzmerre*, . 3 vols, p. 9-10.

176 KK 2728, p. 21

two-thirds of the incomes of *mukataa*; and *avarız*; should be collected in gold, silver or para while the remaining one-thirds should be collected in mankur and also should be delivered to state treasury in the same manner.¹⁷⁷ In the same year another decree was issued concerning the problem of double selling. With this firman, a guarantee was given to tax farmers on the prevention of reselling of tax farms before the end of the contract.¹⁷⁸

A major issue regarding our subject is the relation of *mukataa* and *iltizam*;system in Fazıl Mustafa Pasha's time with *malikane*; system of which the application became widespread by a decree dating 1695. It's well known that a *malikane*;is a life-term tax farm instead of a fixed short-term arrangement lasting one to three years.¹⁷⁹ According to Mehmet Genç the *malikane*;system was applied before 1695 in Southeastern Anatolia and Egypt. But where and how the application of *malikane*, both long before the issuance of the decree and also during the time of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, should be understood. Wars, especially those after 1683, caused a growing gap between the incomes and expenditures of the State. (see Table III below)¹⁸⁰

177 Abdullah İbn İbrahim, *Vakîât*, p. 15-16.

178 Ibid, p. 9-10.

179 Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi", *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri, metinler Tartışmalar*, Ankara, 1975, p. 231-191.

180 DBŞM 569, p.1-20

Table III

Year	Income (kese)	Outcome (kese)
1053	8574	8563
1064	13443	16458
1072	9687	9893
1077	13835	15886
1099	14007	18020
1102	11315	16257
1103	16363	18583
1104	16067	18380
1105	15948	19004
1106	18933	22283
1108	18773	21923

To solve this problem, the state looked for means to control its budget, increase its income and to decrease the expenditures.¹⁸¹ For this purpose the State begin to sell the *mukataas* in return for a fixed lump sum, *maktu*, instead of bidding at auction. For instance, in the province of Rakka, the case above, the deserted *mukataa*;villages were transformed into *maktu*; and were sold as tax farms to local prominent figures.¹⁸² This application of *maktu*; system was not only limited to Southeastern Anatolia, it was also applied in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. For instance in Rumelia, Filibe, the *çeltik mukataası* was transformed into *maktu*; in the year 1688 and sold to a tax-farmer.¹⁸³ Other

181 Mehmet Genç, *Malikâne*, p. 233-235.

182 MAD 9856, p. 30, "Mukâta'ât-ı kazâ-i Ruha, Rakka eyâletinde vâki ' 200 mikdârı mukâta'ât karyeleri olub, 10-20 seneden berü Ekrâd ta'cizinden ve sâir tekâlifden 20-30 mikdân karyesi kalub, maadası hâlî ve harâbe oub, hâlâ mu'attal kalmağla hâlâ vilâyetin a'yân ve eşrâf, 'ulemâ ve sülehâsı zikr olunan harâbe karyeleri çift koşub, şen ve âbâdân maktû' eylemek üzere ta'ahhüt etmeleriyle sene be sene maktu'ların tarâf-ı mîrî edâ ve teslîm eylemeğe maktu'ların da beylerbeyler ve voyvodalar ve emînler bozmamak için Rakka muhassılı 'arzı mücebince emir verilmişdir. Fî 6 N 1101".

183 MAD 7550, p. 81, "Kili nezâretinden Akkırman mukâta'asına tâbi Şeyhderesi demekle ma'rûf Sarıbay adlı karyede ancak iki nefer adam sâkin olub, arzîsî zirâ'atden hâlî olmağla senevî 2.000 akça nâzır olanlara sene be sene verilmek üzere ber-vech-i maktû' kayd ve berât verilmek bâbında mezbûr Mustafa ricâ edüb, 'arz-ı hâl etmekle fi'l-vâki' hâlî olduğı

cases of this can easily be found.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, after the 1680's members of military class begin to have priority on the purchase of *maktu mukataas* as *iltizams* by leaving their salaries, named *hazinemande* to the state treasury. The state was in favor of this application, because it was both holding the salary and also the lump sum. For instance in the year 1682, Abdülbaki Yusuf Ağa, without drawing his salary of 15 akça per day, had moreover paid 175.000 akça each year for the purchase of the *mukataa*; of Bergos customs.¹⁸⁵

It can be said that the *maktu* system had become widespread during the period of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, and especially between the years 1689-1691 many *mukataas* were sold as tax-farms under this procedure. The *berats* and the contracts held before the year 1689 were renewed. Moreover, same tax-farmers had purchased these *mukataas* as *malikane*; after the year 1695.¹⁸⁶ Finally it can be concluded that the application of *maktu* system, in fact a period of smooth transition to *malikane*; accelerated and became widespread in the Ottoman Empire during the time of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha until the year 1695, when finally it was transformed to *malikane*; system and it acquired a new title and legitimacy .

Confiscations:

The state levied extra taxes from the reaya as necessary and also collected taxes and borrowed money from statesmen in different ways. Moreover, when tax-exempt persons from the military class died the state seized the cash portion of their inheritance.¹⁸⁷ Fazıl Mustafa Pasha carried out many such confiscations on the grounds that the wealth was acquired unjustly. He

vâki' ise mahalline kayd olunub berât verilmek üzere telhîs olunub, arz olundukda mücebince berât verile deyü târih-i merkûmda fermân-ı 'âli sâdır olmağla berât verilmişdir. Fî 15 Za 1100".

184 MAD 9856, p. 71, "Akkirman kazasına tâbi karye-i Hacı Tablı ümenâ iltizâmından hâric başka maktû' olub, mezbûrlar kendi mallarıyla çift koşub, en ve âbâdân ve mâl-ı mîrîsin sene be sene her niceye ise voyvodalara vakt ü zamân ile edâ ve teslîm ve yedinde ma'mûline temessük aldıklarınca nice ber vechi dimûsiyet mutasarrıflar olub, ümenâ tarâfindan ve tarâf-ı âhârdan müdâhale olunmaya deyü berât-ı şerîf verilmişdir. Fî 3 Ca 1101".

185 MAD 3076, p. 17; MAD 7550, p. 8; 27; MAD 9856, p. 71; MAD 10277, p. 136-138.

186 MAD 3076 includes selling of the lump sum *mukataas* which were given as *iltizam* between the years of 1689-1691; MAD 7550, p. 27.

187 M. Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, p. 624-625.

confiscated 20 million akça from the estate of former kaim-makam Çelebi Mehmed, 55 million akça from former Grand Vizier Bekri Mustafa Pasha and 25 million akça from Serasker Mahmud Efendi. In this way, he had procured a great deal of income for the treasury.¹⁸⁸

Other economic measures taken by Fazıl Mustafa Pasha were the strict control of people who owed money to the treasury and the punishment of those who did not pay their debt.¹⁸⁹ Grand viziers, defterdars and janissary aghas gave gifts, *pişkeş*, every year to the sultan. The amount was extremely high and people who gave *pişkeş* did not refrain from abuses in order to regain the money spent by them. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha abolished this practice in order to prevent these abuses.¹⁹⁰

Conclusion

From the second siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottomans struggled against the armies of the Holy League, namely Austria and Venice in Rumelia, the Morean Peninsula and in the Aegean. Almost all confrontations led to Ottoman defeat and resulted in territorial losses. As a result of the defeats the state faced tremendous problems at home, such as the crises in military, financial, political and social spheres.

At such a time, the state found an able leader in the person of the Grand Vizier Fazıl Mustafa Pasha. Fazıl Mustafa Pasha had in his early life received a good education, devoted himself to scholarly studies -especially in hadith- and even established a library. He personally joined the campaigns of Kandiye and Poland during his elder brother's grand vizierate and improved his experience in the military field. He also developed experience within the state organization and bureaucracy when his brother-in-laws Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha and Siyavush Pasha were governor. Besides these, because of his familiarity with various areas of Anatolia and Rumelia, he had gained a good knowledge of the problems that the people were suffering from as well as the condition of the state.

188 Raşit, *Tarih-i Raşit*, 2 vols, İstanbul, 1906, p. 100-101, 122.

189 MD 99, p. 18, 19, 70, 124, 142, 149, 158, 162, 163, 173, 175.

190 Defterdar, *Zübde*, p. 358.

Having these capabilities, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha became prominent by his activities toward the improvement of the state's affairs, when he was promoted to the post of sadrazam. Above all, in order to regain the confidence of the people and prevent Christian subject from siding with the enemy, he aimed at removing the heavy tax burden levied by his predecessors. Knowing that, to end the long wars, it was necessary first to solve the financial crisis, he undertook radical measures to provide income for the state treasury. Rather than short-term measures such as adding new taxes as his predecessors did, he chose to take long-term measures to provide a steady income for the state. One of these measures was to cut the unjust gains of the parasitic elements within the janissaries. For that reason he ordered a first general survey to establish the number of "real" janissaries. This survey showed that so much money of the state was spent in unnecessary ways. He expelled about twenty thousand janissaries who had illegally entered the army. This effort provided 12 million akça for the state treasury. Another source of income that he channelled into the state treasury was his transfer of cizye collecting from the wakfs to the state in this case, he provided 200 million akça to the state treasury. While doing this he also classified christians according to their financial status and levied the cizye accordingly. Other than this, by putting strict control on those who were unwilling to pay their debts to the state, he provided a considerable income source. The final long-term measure he took was to facilitate the return of those farmers who were uprooted from their land because of the wars by giving them oxen and seed.

He also tried to make the best use of military resources within the empire. For this reason he mobilized janissaries and timarli sipahis all over the empire in order to increase military potential. In doing this he especially used Turkomans and Yürüks in Rumelia and Anatolia. The success of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha during his grand vizierate was ultimately dependent on emphasizing the religion factor and the support of ulema. Therefore he never, faced opposition in achieving his aims. He always emphasized religion and stated that every transaction was for the benefit of Islam and the state, while putting his plans into action. The ulema which began to become effective during the grand vizierate period of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha reached the pinnacle of its power with Sheyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi in the early eighteenth century.

Consequently, one may claim that the grand vizierate period of Fazıl Mustafa Pasha was a period of recovery in the military, economic and political spheres. Especially the reforms introduced in the economic field were a learning experience for Ottoman governners. For instance the policy of minting mankur, introduced during this period, was never again exercised. Benefits of the reform of the cizye became apparent in that period and this system continued until the middle of the nineteenth century.