

Sonuç olarak bu kitap, Suraiya Faroqhi'in geniş altyapısının bir ürünü olup bir çeşit araştırma rehberi ve ajandası sunmaktadır. Ayrıca bu çalışmasıyla Faroqhi, hem elitin hem de sıradan insanın hareketliliğine odaklanmaktadır. Özellikle sıradan insanlara yoğunlaşmasının özel nedeni, toplumun çoğunluğunu oluşturan fakat seslerini az duyduğumuz özneler olmalarından dolayıdır. Onları tarihte var ederek unutulmaktan kurtarırken, bir yandan da devletin/siyasi elitin endişelerini göz önünde bulundurmaktadır. Endişelerine rağmen, devletin her alana nüfuz eden/edebilen bir devlet olmadığını gözler önüne sermektedir. Yazar, var olan literatüre, değişebilen, aktif ve devlet dışı aktörlerin de bulunduğu bir dünyayı resmederek katkı sunmaktadır. Bunu yapabilmesinin yolunun da öznelerden ve onların içinde buldukları ağlara bakmaktan geçtiğini bildiği aşikardır. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yollara Düşenler: Zanaatkârlar, Köylüler, Tacirler, Sığınmacılar, Elçiler, 16.- 18. Yüzyıllar* adıyla 2016 yılında Kitap Yayınevi tarafından piyasaya çıkarılacak olan *Travel and Artisans in the Ottoman Empire* adlı kitap, yazarın diğer çalışmalarında olduğu gibi gündelik yaşamın birçok yönünü gözler önüne sermektedir. Kısacası, Suraiya Faroqhi bu kitabıyla da bizi, Osmanlı dünyasına seyahat ettirmekte ve o dünyanın içine sokma başarısını göstermektedir.

Nalan Turna

Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi

Elina Gugliuzzo,

Economic and Social Systems in the Early Modern Age Seaports: Malta, Messina, Barcelona and Ottoman Maritime Policy,

Lewiston/Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2015, 249 pp.,

ISBN 978-149-5503-86-3.

The Mediterranean in the early modern period witnessed a great struggle between the Ottoman and Spanish empires. In this imperial rivalry for maritime domination, the Ottomans and the Spanish mobilized immense resources to build and arm galley fleets. While the Ottomans mostly made these naval efforts in the Tersâne-i Âmire in a centralized way, the Spanish distributed their naval

construction to different shipyards: Barcelona in the Iberian Peninsula; Messina and Napoli in the central Mediterranean.

Elina Gugliuzzo's objective in her book is described by Prof. Giuseppe Restifo in his preface as a "desire towards the mutual understanding and the peaceful co-existence of the Mediterranean people, with the denial of the clash of civilizations, the refusal of the old-fashioned orientalism, the criticism of the limited vision of the western historiography" (p. xxvi). The author's foreword largely focuses on the Military Revolution and criticizes "Eurocentric and Orientalist scholars" for excluding the Ottomans (p. xv-xx). Gugliuzzo focuses on the Mediterranean history and shipbuilding industry with four case studies: Constantinople (İstanbul), Malta, Messina and Barcelona. She excludes the Venetian Arsenal because it has been one of the most studied arsenals in the Mare Nostrum. Each of these strategical Mediterranean naval centers is examined separately in different chapters. Gugliuzzo says that these Mediterranean centers were "linked together in terms of rivalries, alliances and reciprocal behaviors" and thus "coexistence between Muslim and Christian was possible, and even common on the Mediterranean frontier, and this was facilitated by the fluidity of both individual and collective identity" (p. xxiii).

In the first chapter entitled "The Ottoman Empire Maritime Policy," Elina Gugliuzzo discusses the rise of the Ottoman navy, Tersâne-i Âmire, Ottoman crews, renegades, dragomans, spies, Tophane-i Âmire and the Ottoman military organization. In this chapter, the author challenges "the myths of the Orientalist and Eurocentric historiography regarding the supposed conservatism, rigidity and backwardness of the Ottoman Empire." Although Gugliuzzo criticizes "Eurocentric and Orientalist historiography", she too fails to escape from the myths about the Ottoman military. For instance, she repeats the cliché on the Ottoman cannons: "...the Ottomans' penchant for big, heavy guns placed them at a disadvantage in mobile field battles against European forces armed with rapid-fire cannons" (p. 64). It is difficult to understand how she can make this error despite the fact that she constantly gives references to Gabor Ágoston and his monumental work in which he debunks this myth by giving details of Ottoman construction of cannons, not just only heavy ones but also high quantity of medium and light cannons.¹

Gugliuzzo asserts that it is not right to place the Ottomans into the wrong context with the western European states, because they operated in east Europe

1 Gábor Ágoston, *The Guns for the Sultans: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

and the eastern Mediterranean (p. 6). The author mentions that Ottomanists prefer to focus on “convergences... and ...ongoing interaction between members of different societies” rather than “simply comparing” the Ottoman and European states (p. 74). Although it is wrong to compare the Ottomans with England, France or Holland of the industrial age, it does not mean that comparative historical method is unnecessary. With the comparative method the historian may better understand his subject by analyzing similarities and differences of two entities under scrutiny. As March Bloch stated a long time ago, the comparative study is only meaningful when based on solid data, detailed facts and analysis. The Ottoman Empire can be compared with the other pre-industrial empires such as the Spanish Monarchy and the Holy Roman Empire in terms of state structure and the military-fiscal bureaucracy in the early modern era.

When she scrutinizes the Ottoman military organization Gugliuzzo writes that “because of the similarity between galley fighting compared with fortress assault and defense, the Ottomans never felt the need to create specific marine units and used regular land forces instead” (p. 69). It is not easy to understand what the author means by similarity between galley fighting and fortress assault and defense. The character of naval warfare is completely different from the terrestrial engagements and there is hardly any similarity to compare it with the siege warfare. First of all, the galley as a fighting platform in the sea hardly provides any cover for defenders with low hulls; so it is not possible to compare it with the protection provided by renaissance fortifications. The galley, by nature, is an assault ship and its tactical usage is boarding the enemy vessel, which means, the firing of heavy cannons in prow is followed by hand-to-hand combat. The siege warfare, on the other hand, is a completely different enterprise which needs elaborate tactics to advance under cover and breach the walls by heavy guns and mining.

In the first chapter Gugliuzzo provides basic information about the Ottoman naval organization based on the secondary sources. This might be useful as a general introduction to non-Turkish readers; but this chapter has very little to offer to academic readers who study naval organization and shipbuilding history. It might have been better if Gugliuzzo had used famous Venetian reports “relazioni” published by Albèri in her first chapter. For example, reports of Venetian representatives Bernardo Navagero (1553), Trevisano (1554), Marino Cavalli (1560), Costantino Garzoni (1573) and Marcantonio Tiepolo (1576) give us detailed information about the Ottoman naval organization, Tersâne-i Âmire, Kapudan Pasha, his office and responsibilities.

The Chapter II deals with the Hospitaller Order of St. John in Malta and the maritime arsenal in Birgu. This part is composed of the history of the Knights of St. John, their operations in the island of Malta, the Ottoman siege of 1565, the arsenal of Birgu, the arsenal workforce, the galley squadron, the galley slaves and corsairing activities of the knights. In the great siege of Malta (p. 88-91) Gugliuzzo highlights successful defense of the knights, the courage of the Maltese, the lack of coordination among the Turkish commanders and the late arrival of the Barbary corsairs; however, she does not mention the Spanish contribution to victory very much. Although they were autonomous in their affairs, Malta and the Order of St. John were under the rule of the Spanish monarchy and the defense of the island was under the joint responsibility of the Spanish naval commanders as well as the Grand Master. We know that the Spanish reinforcements and the final relief force commanded by D. García de Toledo were quite important for the decision of withdrawal of Ottoman forces. In addition, during the siege the Spanish galleys were harassing Ottoman galleys carrying much-needed grain and other supplies.²

In the second chapter of her book the author also discusses the galley squadron of the Knights, the arsenal in Birgu and the construction of galleys. The Order of St. John gave great importance to corsairing activities as a part of their crusading mission against the Muslims. Gugliuzzo mentions that there was an arsenal in Birgu in 1374 for constructing and repairing ships (p. 91-92). In 1538 the Order of St. John decided to build an arsenal which seemed necessary for constructing and maintaining its galley fleet. Its galley squadron was composed of five units; its small size did not require a large shipyard and storehouse. Moreover, galleys were also built in Sicilian royal arsenals, Barcelona and Marseille due to the lack of timber and other building materials. However, according to the author, foreign-made galleys hardly met the high standards of performance expected by the Order (p. 99). Although the Maltese galleys followed the western Mediterranean standards of heavily armed and equipped galleys, they were supposed to have the agility and the maneuverability in order to capture their preys in corsairing activities.

Elina Gugliuzzo gives details on the naval construction in Messina in chapter III and deals with the arsenals in this important port city, namely the Tarzanà, the Arsenale Nuovo and the Arsenale Nuovissimo. In the beginning of this chapter the author describes Messina as “during the early modern age, a dynamic place

2 John F. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and the Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century* (London, Conway Maritime Press, 2003), 191-206.

for international exchange, an important hub that connected the Mediterranean trade with the macro-economies of the European colonial powers” (p. 119). Gugliuzzo emphasizes the importance of Messina as a “gate of Sicily, gate towards the Levant, gate between East and West” (p. 120). Sicily was conquered by Arabs in the 9th century and the Muslim rule over the island lasted until the 11th century. Under the Muslim sovereignty Sicily served as a commercial intermediary between Al-Andalus and the Muslim East. Since the defense of Sicily depends on a fleet, a small shipyard, the Tarzanà, was built in order to construct, arm and maintain Muslim galleys (p. 127).

In the 11th century the Normans overthrow the Arabs and Sicily became a Christian dominion once again. According to the author, “in order to encourage the maritime traffic the Normans decided to enlarge and restructure the previous arsenal” (p. 131). However, economic reasons were not the only ones for constructing a new arsenal in a new location. The *Arsenale Nuovo* was built to meet the military aims of the Normans: the construction and reparation of the Royal Fleet. In the second half of the 16th century, while the Ottoman and Spanish naval forces were fighting for the control of the Mediterranean, Sicily became an important naval base for Spain’s Mediterranean strategy. The Viceroy of Sicily and the commander of the Spanish Mediterranean Fleet D. García de Toledo ordered the construction of a new dockyard, storehouses, biscuit ovens and all facilities necessary for galleys and their crews. A new shipyard, the *Arsenale Nuovissimo*, was also built to increase the shipbuilding capabilities of Messina. Gugliuzzo emphasizes the importance of Messina as the principal rally base of Spanish fleet for its operations against the Ottomans, for instance during the siege of Malta (1565) and the naval battle of Lepanto (1571). Shipyards of Messina lost their importance and they were dismantled in 1615 by the order of the viceroy Duke of Osuna.

In the final chapter, Elina Gugliuzzo focuses on the Spanish naval policies and Drassanes in Barcelona. According to her the arsenal of Barcelona “...was to be result both of Barcelona’s commercial prosperity and the Catalan-Aragonese monarchy’s drive for supremacy in the Mediterranean” (p. 178-179). The author examines timber resources which were crucial for the galley construction, and the regulations set by the Spanish royal authority to protect forests. She argues that Spain and Venice had strict regulations for preserving their forests while on the other hand the Ottomans “instituted no such regulations, instead relying on continued extensive exploitation of the abundant forests within its territory” (p. 162). It is not easy to agree with this assumption, because several imperial edicts

in the archives clearly demonstrate the Ottoman concern for the conservation of the forests.¹ The author furthermore deals with the foreign experts in the Spanish shipyards and focuses on the importance of Genoese craftsmen, carpenters and caulkers in the arsenal of Barcelona (p. 168).

Gugliuzzo's work is very ambitious as she aims to cover all major naval construction centers in the Mediterranean except the Venetian arsenal. This book deals with the Ottoman naval policy, Tersâne-i Âmire, the Knights of Malta, the arsenal of Birgu, the shipyards of Messina and lastly the Spanish maritime policy and the royal arsenal in Barcelona. This should be a challenging task to achieve in only 249 pages. For that reason, this book inevitably lacks the necessary details and references. The introduction of the book focuses on the Military Revolution which has no or very little relevance to the title of early modern seaports. Although every chapter has its own plan and conclusion, the book does not include a general conclusion which evaluates the study. Furthermore, it does not establish a relation among the major naval centers in the general context of the Mediterranean history.

Hüseyin Serdar Tabakođlu
Kırklareli University

Palmira Brummett,

Mapping the Ottomans: Sovereignty, Territory, and Identity in the Early Modern Mediterranean,

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, xviii + 365 pages, 113 b/w illus., 15 colour plates, ISBN: 978-110-7090-77-4.

This book is about more than merely maps. The "mapping" in the title encompasses more than making drawings of coastlines, rivers, mountains, and cities on flat sheets of paper. Beyond delineating, mapping is also an activity of appropriating, compartmentalizing, characterizing, representing, and misrepresenting.

1 İdris Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersane-i Amire* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), 102-120.