

Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923: A Critical Assessment of Hans-Lucas Kieser's *When Democracy Died: The Middle East's Enduring Peace of Lausanne*¹

Yücel Güçlü*

24 Temmuz 1923 Lozan Barış Antlaşması: Hans-Lucas Kieser'in When Democracy Died: The Middle East's Enduring Peace of Lausanne Adlı Eserinin Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirmesi

Öz ■ Türkiye ile İngiltere, Fransa, İtalya, Japonya, Yunanistan, Romanya ve Sırp-Hırvat-Sloven Krallığı arasında 24 Temmuz 1923 tarihinde imzalanan Lozan Barış Antlaşması Birinci Dünya Savaşından sonra taraflarca serbest bir şekilde müzakere edilen ve muteberliği günümüze kadar süren yegane antlaşmadır. Antlaşma, imzalanmasının 100. yılı olan 2023'de Türkiye'de ve yurtdışında genişçe tartışılmıştır. İs- viçreli Alman tarih profesörü Hans-Lukas Kieser kitabında işlediği konuları Türkiye Cumhuriyeti perspektifinden ziyade Ermeni, Kürt, Asuri ve diğer azınlıklar açısından ele almakta ve antlaşmanın bu grupların Türklerin elinde uğradıkları soykırımı meşrulaştırdığını iddia etmektedir. Kieser'in literatürdeki kaynakları eksik ve yanlış kullandığı; ayrıca, barış, demokrasi, etnik temizlik ve soykırım gibi kavramları gerçek anlamlarından açıkça çarpıttığı görülmektedir. Kitapta, Nazilerin "Dersim soykırımı sırasında Alevi Kürtlerin öldürülmesi için Ankara'ya zehirli gaz gönderdikleri", Şubat 1920'de Maraş'ta 10.000 Ermeni'nin Türklerce katledildiği ve Ermeni temsilcilerinin Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyinin 1921 tarihli toplantılarında kuvvetli manevi ve fıkri destek gördükleri gibi dayanaksız iddialara da yer verilmektedir. Ancak bu suçlamaları kanıtlayacak hiçbir belge ve somut delil ortaya konamamaktadır. *When Democracy Died: The Middle East's Enduring Peace of Lausanne* gittikçe gelişen çağdaş Türk araştırmaları alanına olumlu bir katkı sağlamamakta ve Lozan Barış Antlaşması hakkında halen devam etmekte olan tartışmalara sağlam bir ilave teşkil etmemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Lozan, Türkler, Ermeniler, Kürtler, Misyonerler.

1 Hans-Lukas Kieser, *When Democracy Died: The Middle East's Enduring Peace of Lausanne* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), viii + 328 pp., 2 maps, 22 figures, biographical notes, chronology, bibliography, index, 39.99 \$ ISBN 978-1-316-51642-3

* Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey.

Hans-Lukas Kieser is Associate Professor at the University of Newcastle, Australia, Adjunct Professor at the University of Zurich. His books include *Talaat Pasha: Father of Modern Turkey, Architect of Genocide* (2018), *Nearest End: American Millennia and Mission to the Middle East* (2010), and the edited volume *Remembering the Great War in the Middle East* (2022).

The Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs of 20 November 1922–24 July 1923 was one of the most important diplomatic gatherings after the First World War. The conclusion of war with Turkey actually took four years and nine months, which was nine months longer than the war had lasted. The Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923—signed by representatives of Turkey on one side and by Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on the other—was the only freely-negotiated treaty to follow the First World War, and the only one to survive until this day. The Turkish republic, in a sense, grew out of the Lausanne settlement.²

At its centenary, the Lausanne Conference and the Treaty continue to haunt the world imagination. Memories of them are, in effect, still living and breathing. The Treaty is not a closed chapter but a living past. It stood the test of years and experience; it proved immensely useful both in time of peace and war. In 2023, commemorative efforts both in Turkey and abroad have been more widespread, diverse, and complex than for any previous period. Atatürk Research Center celebrated the occasion with an international symposium in Ankara on 17–18 July 2023, attended by about forty-three scholars representing a wide variety of institutions. It is announced that symposium contributions will appear in print and become accessible to the public at large.

For many who lives in or are concerned with the region the subject is now a matter of debate. Scholarly interest in its history from national perspectives appears to be as vigorous as ever. Researchers have adopted various approaches. The recent literature offers varying interpretations and views to read the Treaty of Lausanne in a new context. On the one hundredth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne a number of historians, on both sides of the Atlantic, have attempted to produce new syntheses or revisions of the subject in question.³ Almost invariably,

2 Text of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923 in *Düstur*, Üçüncü Tertip, vol. 5 (İstanbul: Necmi İstikbal Matbaası, 1931), pp. 12–357; *League of Nations Treaty Series*, 28, 1–4 (1924), pp. 11–114.

3 See, for example, Jonathan Conlin and Ozan Özacı (eds.), *They All Made Peace—What Is Peace? The 1923 Lausanne Treaty and the New Imperial Order* (Chicago: University of

these authors have written from a pre-judged point of view, and their polemical overtones have aroused controversy and debate. The temptation to evaluate the developments of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) for more current political purposes is a feature of much of this literature. The need to comprehend the reasons which led to the Turkish War of Independence and to interpret its significance in contemporary history has been the subject of considerable discussion in recent years. The heated polemics between “traditionalists” and “revisionists” contribute to deeper and more thorough research on Turkish goals and reactions.

Kieser’s project is both an ambitious and audacious one and such an enterprise raises intriguing questions about intentions and effects. The major theme developed throughout *When Democracy Died* is that mentioned by Marc David Baer in the dust jacket:

Rather than viewing the Treaty of Lausanne from the perspective of the victorious founders of the Turkish Republic, this critical study examines the Treaty from that of its losers. Kieser argues that the Treaty legalized and rewarded ethnic cleansing; sounded the death-knell for democratic self-determination; and ushered in extreme nationalist, authoritarian rule in Turkey.

Arranged both chronologically and thematically, the narrative mainly covers the Lausanne Conference and its aftermath. After a general introduction, the book consists of four parts under the headings of “A Century’s Pivotal Peace”; “Against the Paris-Geneva Peace: Bolsheviks, Turkists, Islamists”; “A Protracted Conference: Redefining Turkey, Western Realpolitik”; “Post-Lausanne Turkey: Most Favored Dictatorship?” In lieu of a conclusion: Time for Democratic Social Contracts follows. Part 1 sets the stage by providing a background on the major topics, terminology, and historical approach applied in the study. It brings the League of Nations into a picture of the early interwar years when the Geneva institution was a prominent actor and a leading reference. It also explains what is meant by the notion of “peace” and its denotation by diverse communities. Part 2 discusses through a variety of angles the history of the pre-Lausanne days that ended a decade of wars and Committee of Union and Progress rule. The historical and political thought of Rıza Nur, the second Turkish delegate in the Lausanne Conference, is explored in depth and the activities of the influential diaspora organizations from Turkey in Geneva and Lausanne before the Conference are described. Part 3,

Chicago Press, 2023); Michelle Tusan, *The Last Treaty: Lausanne and the First World War in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

the core of the book, reviews the course of the Conference, and the stakes of the main players and their home-countries' expectations in the commissions, subcommittees, plenary sessions and informally are outlined. It aspires to demonstrate, in a critical fashion, what had transpired and for what reason. This part is the longest, 101 pages with 278 footnotes. Part 4 endeavors to show how the Conference and the Treaty structured Turkey and its neighborhood. In *Time for Democratic Social Contracts*, the author summarizes his main findings and asks how to go ahead "beyond Lausanne" without resorting to Treaty revisions.

Kieser's survey is not a model of clarity, in thinking and writing. The presentation does not set out definitions clearly. There is a certain obscurity in the manner in which the detail of the argument is developed and when Kieser is transparently clear, it is not obvious that the weight of the evidence supports his conclusions. This expository deficiency seems to be tied to the complexity of the events that the author describes and also to a disjunction between this description and the ostensible concerns of the book. To give two examples will suffice. Studying a regional peace such as the Lausanne settlement requires a reflection on what peace actually is. Is it state of freedom from war or violence, or state of calm and quiet or state of harmony and friendship? Or else granting autonomy to Kurds in Southeastern Anatolia? Or recognition of the Armenian genocide with all its consequences? Kieser does not express himself in plain words by what he understands of the notion of peace. Throughout his book the author also does not give a definition of the term genocide.

The study relies primarily on the Turkish, Swiss and League of Nations archives supplemented by information from published memoirs, diaries, the contemporary press reports and some of the printed document collections put out by the French government. In his bibliography the author also lists over a hundred books, monographs, and articles, in English, French, German, or Turkish. Unfortunately, though, many of these secondary sources do not seem to have been read very carefully.

Conspicuously missing from the sources are the edited detailed reports by daily *İkdam* correspondent Ahmet Cevdet and by daily *İleri* correspondent Suphi Nuri İleri published on the occasion of the centenary of the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in early 2023.⁴ *İkdam* was one of the oldest and most widely circulated

4 Nuri Sağlam (ed.), *Türk Basınında Lozan: Ahmet Cevdet'in Lozan Makaleleri* (İstanbul: Albaraka Yayınları, 2023); idem (ed.), *Türk Basınında Lozan: Suphi Nuri İleri'nin Lozan Mektup ve Makaleleri* (İstanbul: Albaraka Yayınları, 2023).

dailies of İstanbul. It served as the mirror of Turkish opinion. Ahmet Cevdet, a journalist with a special interest in foreign affairs, was the proprietor of *İkdam*. His clear style and meticulous documentation (of the result of confidential sources of information) earned for his daily an important audience both at home and abroad. *İleri*, meaning Forward, was the leading newspaper in Turkey at the period which gained greatly in prestige and influence among the public, in the press, in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT), and in government. In it appeared the most distinguished journalists, among whom must be mentioned Suphi Nuri İleri, who was the master of a clear, concise style. Much information is available in the writings of these Turkish journalists who followed the deliberations of the Lausanne Conference on the spot. Their observations and commentaries should be a means to open a new stage in the historical survey of the Conference by placing them in the larger context of the day. Not only would they help to vary many published accounts; they might also have brought to light much additional information. They reflected the perception of events at the time and often provided a highly reliable guide to chronology, without which any interpretation of history was impossible. The translation of these books into English is needed for future research.

One also wonders why the author did not benefit from the proceedings of the GNAT, with the exception of only two minor instances on pages 141 and 247. The debates made in the meetings of the GNAT in 1922-1923 and in its aftermath form one of the principal sources for an understanding of the Lausanne Conference and the Treaty. The records of the assembly in these years are of central importance for a comprehension of the ideas and practices of government and politics, while its legislation is a vital source for contemporary perceptions and practices in a wide range of political activities. These have proved invaluable to such specialists who have used them widely. They contain much rich ore which could have been mined usefully and interestingly by Kieser, in many more ways, to the betterment of scholarship.

Moreover, it is surprising that Kieser does not consult the Papers of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) kept at Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. In the text virtually no use is made of the voluminous files there. It should be recalled that throughout the Lausanne Conference various American missionaries and representatives of relief organizations and humanitarian associations sought to enlist support from the United States (US) delegation for the creation of an Armenian national home

in Cilicia in south-central part of Asia Minor. They specified a region between the Ceyhan and Euphrates rivers, extending north to Kozan and Elbistan, as a satisfactory location for a possible Armenian home. The arguments advanced were the usual ones: that Armenians had lived in Turkey for many centuries, and thus were entitled to a place in Turkey for a home. Pro-Armenian groups in the US importuned through the State Department. Representing the Federal Council of the Protestant Churches of America at Lausanne were James Barton and William Peet, of the ABCFM; George Montgomery was there on behalf of the Armenia-America Society. The statements of these three, in the form of a memorandum signed by Montgomery, was submitted by the US delegation to the Subcommittee on Minorities of the Conference on 30 December 1922. Apart from stirring up considerable irritation among the Turkish delegation, Montgomery's memorandum had no effect upon the Conference, and no official action came of it. The Turkish second delegate, Rıza Nur, did issue a direct warning that American missionaries and relief workers would be expelled from Turkey if the US persisted in the demand for an Armenian home.⁵

A further illustration of Kieser's selectivity in handling his material is the use of quotes from the Americans. One member of the US delegation at the Lausanne Conference, Joseph Grew, is quoted twenty-three times (pp. 20, 23, 48, 123, 128, 130, 141, 159, 160, 199, 204, 211, 216, 218, 220, 282, 283), but another member of the same delegation, Mark Bristol, is ignored except on one minor occasion (p. 98). Seen through an Armenian prism Grew's role is exaggerated, while the importance of Bristol goes unappreciated. Bristol's Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, Washington D. C. comprise some 33,000 items, including reports, diaries, correspondence, copies of official dispatches, telegrams and appointment sheets. By far the overwhelming majority of this material dates from Bristol's tenure in Turkey. Throughout his sojourn in Turkey extending from 1919 to 1927 as US High Commissioner, he received almost daily reports from hundreds of American missionaries, relief workers, as well as from his own intelligence staff, as to events in the countryside. Included in these reports was a great deal of material on Turkish-Armenian relations. All in all, Bristol left behind a formidable historical record, one that has been consulted with renewed enthusiasm over the decades. Even a cursory examination of the Bristol Papers establishes the fact

5 John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), pp. 143-144; "Turks Warn United States of Moslem Army", *The Washington Post*, 2 January 1923, p. 1.

that the US High Commissioner in the Turkish capital had a thorough grasp of the complexities involved. Far from endorsing the one-sided view of Armenians as innocent and victims and Turks as guilty perpetrators, Bristol clearly understood that there was plenty of blame to go around. Plainly, Bristol, rather than being an advocate for one position or another, reported to his superiors in Washington on what was occurring in Turkey. In short, Bristol interpreted his brief to mean that rather than advance the partisan claims of one or another ethnic group, it was his job to provide Washington with an objective analysis of the situation on the ground. This meant that he recognized the strengths and weaknesses of all the peoples living in the region.

Major inaccuracies and feckless observations mar *When Democracy Died*, each part containing numerous problems of substance. The book mentions that Nazis “sent poison gas to Ankara that served to kill Alevi Kurds during the Dersim genocide” (p. 8). This is patently untrue. The facts are otherwise. The author gives no source or reference for his charge. He does not cite a single document, speech or comment that substantiates his allegation. No empirical evidence to document this claim has ever been uncovered in any archive. To the contrary, in Britain’s Foreign Office archival documents it is clearly indicated that the Turkish government was party to the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, whereby it accepted the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or of other gases. It is also referred that employment of poisonous gas in war demanded sophisticated training and in 1938 the Turkish army had no experts to conduct such operations.⁶ Kieser takes his conclusions ready-made from others, instead of forming them himself from the sources he uses. It is the historian’s task to examine motives, causes and consequences without rancor or partisan loyalty; this Kieser does not.

The author’s contention that the Turkish “Foreign Ministry documents are still hardly accessible” (p. 18) is incorrect. Since 2019 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey is carrying out its most comprehensive archive project in the history of the country. At present around 65 million pages of documents are being digitized, indexed, and declassified. For a better understanding of

6 Foreign Office Papers, The National Archives, Kew, London (henceforth referred to as FO) E 3036/3036/44/385/52. FO Minute (Baxter), 30 May 1938. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 under the auspices of the League of Nations and entered into force on 8 February 1928. It was ratified by Turkey on 5 October 1929.

Turkish foreign policy, documents that are of crucial importance are now available. The copies of documents are digitally at the disposal of the public through the BETSIS Documents Search System of the Turkish State Archives as an easy and rapidly accessible site. Between 1 November 2019 and 10 May 2024 18,981 people searched the documents of the Turkish Diplomatic Archives using the Document System of the State Archives. 2,313 different researchers added 99,191 documents to their study lists. 548 of others have acquired 44,342 documents (165,776 image-documents) from research rooms of the State Archives.

The newly opened documents will add significantly to our knowledge of contemporary Turkish history. They may open up new perspectives on major issues which have not been examined effectively before. Both Turkish and foreign scholars, who seek to conduct research on Turkey's international relations, are now taking advantage of these new possibilities. New scholarship is published in Turkish based on this documentation. But the Swiss historian has unfortunately found it expedient to ignore the declassified materials which have been available for more than five years.

Kieser is wrong to call Franz Werfel's *Forty Days of Musa Dagh* to be a "documentary novel" (p. 43). Werfel did not feel an obligation to record all that had happened. Foremost, the Armenian insurgency on Musa Dagh lasted, contrary to the book's title, for fifty-three days. The change of the days by Werfel "called up biblical associations: the flood lasted forty days and nights; Moses spent forty days and nights on Mount Sinai; Israel's time in the wilderness was forty years." Werfel was not a conscientious person and was not subservient to the cause of truth. The book did not present the Austrian author's reconstruction of the facts and of documents. He depended mostly on printed propaganda material and on the memory of the Armenian insurgents of the Musa Dagh uprising. The author of the *Forty Days of Musa Dagh* was not guided by documentary records and did not cross-check narratives. The papers of the Pastor Johannes Lepsius and Aram Andonian that were used later proved to be distorted and forged. Further, a close examination of Ottoman archival documents demonstrates that the depiction of events in the novel do not correspond to facts.⁷

⁷ Franz Werfel, *Forty Days of Musa Dagh*, trans. Geoffrey Dunlop (New York: The Viking Press, 1934); Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia 1914-1923* (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2010), pp. 93-95; Edward Erickson, "Bayonets at Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operation, 1915", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28/3 (2005), pp. 542-543.

The author asserts that “about ten thousand defenseless Armenians in Marash in February 1920 were massacred” (p. 103), which is undoubtedly an overestimate. He produces no detailed information on the subject, nor does he inform the sources from which he derived his information. All of the figures provided in various publications are approximate and do not give anything approaching a valid picture of the Armenian casualties in Marash. Such exaggerated figures therefore should be taken with much reserve. It is difficult to determine the real number of the human losses, for no official statistics emanating from Ottoman or independent sources containing a precise number of fatalities was compiled. As British Consul General in Beirut, Albert Charles Wratishaw, reported to Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon all estimates of numbers of Armenians killed in Marash in February 1920 were conjectural.⁸

Kieser errs in saying that there is “no scholarly biography of İnönü” (p. 140, n. 51). Faruk Loğoğlu’s *İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey* is the outgrowth of his doctoral dissertation completed at Princeton University under the supervision of Professor Manfred Halpern.⁹ This survey is, at its core, a personal and political profile of İsmet İnönü. In this book, the author achieves what has eluded other scholars, both Turkish and non-Turkish: a truthful depiction of İnönü—one that is neither hagiography nor condescension. The author reveals İnönü’s strengths and as well as shortcomings and above all, his dedication, courage, tenacity, and vision. *İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey* is a fresh interpretation of a magisterial subject and an authoritative work, against which future efforts will be measured. The author treats İnönü as a realist and pragmatist whose actions derived from convictions that did not vary much throughout his long career. Caution and moderation were the watchwords. This portrayal draws on an extensive use of extant primary sources and secondary literature of great diversity, coupled with the author’s own face-to-face personal interviews with his subject.¹⁰

The reader is told that the Armenian representatives “enjoyed a strong moral and intellectual support in the League’s Assembly” (p. 162), yet this is not the

8 FO/406/43/E. Hostilities in Marash: Consul General Albert Charles Wratishaw to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, 29 February 1920.

9 Faruk Loğoğlu, *İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey* (Ankara: Ajans-Türk Basın ve Basım A. Ş., 1998).

10 Yücel Güçlü, “Review of Faruk Loğoğlu’s *İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey*”, *The Middle East Journal*, 54/3 (2000), pp. 486-487.

exact case. When on 21 September 1921 the question of an Armenian homeland came up on the agenda of the fifteenth plenary meeting of the second session of the League of Nations Assembly, Lord Robert Cecil, the representative of South Africa, drew attention to the difficulties of the position. He remarked that the League had no means of influencing the government of GNAT, either morally or materially, nor had any nation been ready to accept the mandate to deal with Armenia.¹¹ It is important to note that at the same meeting of the assembly, Zoka-Ed-Dowleh, the representative of Iran, felt obliged to state that Armenia had committed a grave error by taking sides in the Great War. All its troubles sprang from the fact that it had wished to intervene in the settlement of great international questions. He said that during the war, nearly 70,000 Armenians enlisted in the Russian army and proceeded to ravage the Turkish and Russian territory, and even part of Iranian Azerbaijan. Armenia had entered this great conflict on its own initiative. The only thing that the League of Nations could do for Armenia, the Iranian representative continued, was to send a committee to discover in which part of the country an Armenian majority existed. Where there was a Turkish majority, he rightly pointed out, the territory should be attached to Turkey; it was impossible to leave a Muslim majority under Armenian rule, as Armenians and Muslims in Turkey had recently been at armed conflict. According to Zoka-Ed-Dowleh, it would be unjust to act otherwise.¹²

Contrary to Kieser's contention, Adolf Hitler's alleged remark "Who still speaks of the Armenians today?" (p. 213) is not genuine. The words are frequently cited as fact and even appear on the wall of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM). Yet the veracity of this quote is questionable at best. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg did not accept during its 23 November 1945 session or in any other session Hitler's quote. Many scholars doubt or do not believe that the Nazi leader could possibly have uttered the statement. For example, Norman Naimark, Robert and Florence McDonnell Professor of East European Studies at Stanford University and a Distinguished Visiting Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, notes: "We cannot be absolutely certain that Hitler referred to the Armenians at all on this occasion."¹³ Cherif Bassiouni,

11 League of Nations, *The Records of the Second Assembly Plenary Meetings* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1921), pp. 294-296.

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 296-297.

13 Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 57.

Professor Emeritus of Law at DePaul University, agrees.¹⁴ Most importantly, on 22 May 1990 Shayke (Jeshajahu) Weinberg, museum director for the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, stated that the Hitler quote was an open controversy and there seemed to be no positive proof that he said it. According to Weinberg, under the circumstances the USHMM had to reconsider its plan to use the quote in its exhibition.¹⁵ And in another interoffice memorandum of the USHMM dated 26 July 1992, it is mentioned that the veracity of the Hitler quote has always been in serious doubt. At its best, the text was a third-hand version of Hitler's address, and the circumstances of its creation created more doubt on its accuracy, not less. According to this memorandum, one could not say whether the statement was authentic or bogus, but the weight of evidence seemed to favor the latter judgment. No stenographic record of Hitler's speech survived, because Hitler had ordered his assistants not to take one. Therefore, all evidence on the content of the speech was indirect. The evidence consisted mainly of notes, or accounts based on notes, taken furtively during the speech by members of the audience. The museum memorandum suggests that Nazi officials compiled the text from the notes of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris of Armed Forces Intelligence (Amt Ausland Abwehr), and passed it on to British diplomats, perhaps hoping to alert them to Hitler's warlike intentions and concludes that this thesis is perhaps is the only interpretation on which all historians agree.¹⁶ Although this reference was never substantiated, it has assumed a life of its own and has been misused for propaganda aims ever since.¹⁷ Politically, "Hitler" is a magic word that conjures up an all-true image of undisputed evil. He is quoted on the Armenian question for polemic and political purpose, to tie the Ottoman Turks to Hitler's evil. In

14 M. Cherif Bassiouni, "World War I: The War to End All Wars and the Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System", *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, 30/1 (2002), p. 290, n. 352.

15 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives (henceforth referred to as USHMM), Director of the Museum: Subject Files of Shayke (Jeshajahu) Weinberg, 1979-1995, Box 7.

16 USHMM, Research Institute: Subject Files of the Director Michael Berenbaum, 1987-1997, Box 3, Interoffice Memorandum from David Luebke to Shayke Weinberg, director of the USHMM and to Michael Berenbaum, Project director of the museum, 26 July 1992.

17 The most reliable version presented at Nuremberg is Admiral Boehm's "Hitler's speech to the Commanders-in-Chiefs, 22 August 1939" printed in its entirety in *Documents on Nazism 1919-1945*, eds. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (New York: The Viking Press, 1974), pp. 562-568.

the modern world nothing defames so well as associating one's enemies with the Führer.

Lastly, the question of genocide. Throughout his book, Kieser persistently accuses Turkey of an "Armenian genocide", a "Kurdish genocide", a "Dersim genocide", a "Greek Orthodox genocide", an "Assyrian genocide", a "Yezidi genocide" and others. But he never bothers to define the word "genocide" itself. Since it is such a loaded term, it would have been helpful if he had. The genocide has been one of the most emotionally wrought subjects that scholars have faced. The term is misunderstood, illegitimately refined, and unnecessarily abused and applied for political, ideological, or dogmatic ends. Without really appreciating its sophistication, both with regard to international law and international scholarship, Kieser has added meanings to the word it was never intended to have. It is primarily a legal term conferred exclusively by international courts and not by historians or politicians, who have no judicial competence to make judgments on such matters. It was invented to describe a specific crime relating to what the Nazis did to Jews. It is the most serious crime that international law has ever defined. In legal practice, the meaning of genocide is indisputable. It has only one meaning, that given to it by the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948. The Convention defines what genocide is and how it can be ascertained. Only a competent court or international tribunal can determine whether an event is genocide, and such a tribunal has not been held on such matters referred by Kieser above. It is also noteworthy that Kieser does not mention the differing interpretations of genocide that exist in the literature. He fails to consider contrary conclusions or indicate why they cannot be maintained.¹⁸

It must be added that framing the history of the Treaty of Lausanne primarily within the context of genocide, as Kieser does, poses some important challenges since the concept itself is the subject of a great deal of contention, debate, and interpretation. One must remember that the notion of genocide was created at a particular point in time for specific legal purposes, and with a particular model of genocide in mind, one that does not always translate easily to other historic examples. This means that genocide has some very real limitations in terms of how it is used and applied. What must be indicated early on, then, is that the issue of genocide, what it means, and how different actions—usually distinguished such

¹⁸ Text of United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 in United Nations Treaty Series, 78, 1951, p. 277.

as massacre, ethnic cleansing, war, and genocide—are inter-related; and it is sometimes difficult to escape the intellectual fog, some deliberately created. All these events are complicated for different reasons. Kieser does not make a clear case of why genocide is the term that describes the experiences of each distinct group. By doing so, he complicates and weakens one's notion of what genocide means, how it can be defined, how it is enacted, and what its consequences are.

Along with substantive shortcomings, factual errors abound, mostly in regard to names, dates and titles. For example, the first name of General İnönü is not İsmail but İsmet (p. 83, figure 6); Talaat Pasha's code name in exile in Berlin was not Ali Said but Ali Saib (p. 111); the surname of the author of the book *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* is not Lades but Ladas (p. 148, n. 74); Cevat Açıkalın's initial first name is not Ahmed but Mehmet Muhittin (p. 158); Cevat Açıkalın was not a member of Rıza Nur's team during the discussions in the Sub-Committee of Minorities held on 6 January 1923 it was Ahmed Cevad (Second Secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Vienna) (p. 158); Münir Ertegün was ambassador in Washington in 1934-1944 not only in 1930s (p. 249); Hasan Saka was the prime minister of Turkey in 1947-1949 not the president of the Republic (p. 291); the first name of the third president of the Turkish Republic is not Cemal but Celal (p. 289); Cevat Açıkalın was not Rıza Nur's but Hasan Saka's secretary in the Lausanne Conference (p. 292). Açıkalın was mostly occupied with the questions on the capitulations, the Ottoman public debt and the legal position of foreigners and their interests in Turkey. Şükrü Kaya did not only act as minister of foreign affairs and minister of the interior in 1924-1937 he also held the portfolio of minister of agriculture in 1924 (p. 295); İskenderun and Antakya were incorporated into Turkey in 1939, not 1938 (p. 307); Turkey landed in Cyprus in 1974, not 1976 (p. 307).

As for the "Select Bibliographical Notes: Ankara's Lausanne Team" sandwiched between the In Lieu of a Conclusion and Select Chronology, its brevity is also a commentary on the author's lack of familiarity with the Turkish diplomatic cadres in the 1920s. Absent here is mention, let alone discussion of influential Turkish officials such as Reşit Safvet Atabinen and their role in the Lausanne Conference.

There are also a number of production mistakes, such as sources cited in the footnotes that do not appear in the bibliography (for instance Şükrü Hanioglu's *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, p. 2, n. 3; Philippe Defarge's *Une histoire mondiale de la paix*, p. 6, n. 10; Elizabeth Thompson's *How the West Stole Democracy*

from the Arabs: The Syrian Arab Congress of 1920, p. 22, n. 4; William Hale's *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*, p. 49, n. 76 and others).

After more than a hundred years the Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs and the Treaty still resonate at various levels among various parties. The debate about the merits of the Treaty remains very much alive. However, *When Democracy Dies* does not represent a welcome contribution to the growing field of modern Turkish studies and is not a sound addition to the present debate. It does not offer a fresh perspective both in terms of topic and analytical approach, and is argued with particular political bias being apparent. Kieser does not show a disinterested desire to provide a cogent and balanced account of the recent Turkish past. The Swiss historian is, in fact, motivated by highly charged, contending convictions about the relationship between the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920¹⁹ and present-day Turkey. Kieser subsumes scholarship to his own political agenda. He omits evidence that undercuts his thesis. The book is decidedly a piece of provocative venture providing material into a subject matter increasingly dominated by a discourse riddled with diatribes.

No reader should turn to this book for information on the Lausanne Conference and the Treaty or on the issues in that field. They are more likely to be confused or misinformed than enlightened. The publication by Cambridge University Press of such shoddy and misconceived work is a cause for both regret and concern.

¹⁹ The Treaty of Sèvres signed between the Ottoman State and the Entente powers on 10 August 1920— among its other provisions—stipulated that an independent Armenia would be established in the northeastern Anatolian provinces adjacent to Soviet Armenia, including Trabzon, Erzurum, Bitlis and Van with US President Thomas Woodrow Wilson designated to determine its exact boundaries (Article 88-93). If within one year from the coming into force of the Treaty of Sèvres the Kurdish peoples would address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of eastern Anatolia and Northern Iraq would desire independence from Turkey, and if the Council then would consider that these peoples were capable of such independence, Turkey would agree to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas (Article 64). Sultan Vahdettin did not ratify the Treaty of Sèvres and it did not enter into force. Text of the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920 in Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri*, vol. 1: *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983), pp. 525-691; *Great Britain, Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920, Cmd. 964, Accounts and Papers*, 25 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920), pp. 16-132.

Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923: A Critical Assessment of Hans-Lucas Kieser's When Democracy Died: The Middle East's Enduring Peace of Lausanne

Abstract ■ The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923 between Turkey and the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, is the only treaty freely negotiated by the parties following the First World War which is still valid presently. The treaty was widely discussed in Turkey and abroad in 2023, the centenary of its signing. In his book, the Swiss-German history professor Hans-Lukas Kieser addresses the topics he covers not so much from the perspective of the Republic of Turkey but rather from the perspective of Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians and other minorities, and claims that the treaty legitimised the genocide these groups suffered at the hands of the Turks. It is evident that Kieser has used sources in the literature incompletely and incorrectly. Furthermore, he has clearly distorted concepts such as peace, democracy, ethnic cleansing and genocide from their true meanings. The book claims that the Nazis “sent poison gas to Ankara for the killing of Alevi Kurds during the Dersim genocide”, that 10,000 Armenians were massacred by Turks in Maraş in February 1920, and that Armenian representatives received strong moral and intellectual support at the League of Nations Council's 1921 meetings. However, no documents or concrete evidence have been produced to substantiate these allegations. *When Democracy Died: The Middle East's Enduring Peace of Lausanne* does not make a positive contribution to the increasingly developed field of contemporary Turkish studies, nor does it constitute a substantial addition to the ongoing debates regarding the Treaty of Lausanne.

Keywords: Lausanne, Turks, Armenians, Kurds, Missionaries.

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